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Abstract
In this work we propose a multi-valued extension of logic programs under the stable models semantics
where each true atom in a model is associated with a set of justifications. These justifications are expressed
in terms of causal graphs formed by rule labels and edges that represent their application ordering. For
positive programs, we show that the causal justifications obtained for a given atom have a direct correspon-
dence to (relevant) syntactic proofs of that atom using the program rules involved in the graphs. The most
interesting contribution is that this causal information is obtained in a purely semantic way, by algebraic op-
erations (product, sum and application) on a lattice of causal values whose ordering relation expresses when
a justification is stronger than another. Finally, for programs with negation, we define the concept of causal
stable model by introducing an analogous transformation to Gelfond and Lifschitz’s program reduct. As a
result, default negation behaves as “absence of proof” and no justification is derived from negative literals,
something that turns out convenient for elaboration tolerance, as we explain with a running example.
KEYWORDS: Answer Set Programming, Causality, Knowledge Representation, Multi-valued Logic Pro-
gramming
1 Introduction
An important difference between classical models and most Logic Programming (LP) semantics
is that, in the latter, true atoms must be founded or justified by a given derivation. Consequently,
falsity is understood as absence of proof: for instance, a common informal way reading for default
literal not p is “there is no way to derive p.” Although this idea seems quite intuitive, it actually
resorts to a concept, the ways to derive p, outside the scope of the standard LP semantics. In
other words, LP semantics point out whether there exists some derivation for an atom, but do not
provide the derivations themselves, if several alternatives exist.
However, such information on justifications for atoms can be of great interest for Knowl-
edge Representation (KR), and especially, for dealing with problems related to causality. In the
area of diagnosis, for instance, when a discrepancy between expected and observed behaviour
∗ This research was partially supported by Spanish MEC project TIN2009-14562-C05-04, Xunta program INCITE 2011
and Inditex-University of Corunna 2013 grants, as well as by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project P24090.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
9.
72
81
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 25
 Se
p 2
01
4
2 P. Cabalar, J. Fandinno & M. Fink
is found, it may be convenient to not only exhibit a set of malfunctioning components as expla-
nation, but also the way (a causal graph) in which these breakdowns have eventually caused the
discrepancies. Another potential application area is legal reasoning where determining a legal
responsability usually involves finding out which agent or agents have eventually caused a given
result, regardless the chain of effects involved in the process. An important challenge in causal
reasoning is the capability of not only deriving facts of the form “A has caused B,” but also being
able to represent them and reason about them. As an example, take the assertion:
“If somebody causes an accident, (s)he is legally responsible for that.”
This law does not specify the possible ways in which a person may cause an accident. Depending
on a representation of the domain, the chain of events from the agent’s action(s) to the final effect
may be simple (a direct effect) or involve a complex set of indirect effects and defaults like inertia.
Regarding representation of the above law, for instance, one might think of an informal rule:
responsible(X ,Y )← action(A), person(X), accident(Y ), “do(A,X) caused occurs(Y )” .
If the pseudo-literal “do(A,X) caused occurs(Y )” actually corresponds to an explicit repre-
sentation of all the possible ways of causing an accident, however, one immediately runs into
a problem of elaboration tolerance (McCarthy 1998) — adding new rules that causally con-
nect do(A,X) to occurs(Y ) (in a direct or indirect way) would force us to build new rules for
responsible(X ,Y ). What is needed instead, and what we actually propose as an eventual aim and
future extension of our work, is to introduce, indeed, some kind of new LP literal “A caused B,”
with an associated semantics capable of revealing causes A of a given true atom B.
While not straightforward, the rewarding perspective of such a semantic approach is an ex-
tension of Answer Set Programming (ASP) (Brewka et al. 2011) with causal literals capable of
representing different kinds of causal influences (sufficient cause, necessary cause, etc). In this
paper, we tackle the above issue and, as a first step and basic underlying requirement, develop a
suitable semantics capable of associating causal justifications with each true atom. To this end,
we propose a multi-valued extension of logic programs under the stable model semantics (Gel-
fond and Lifschitz 1988) where each true atom in a model is associated with a set of justifications
in the form of causal graphs. To further illustrate our motivation, consider the following example.
Example 1 (From Cabalar 2011)
Some country has a law l that asserts that driving drunk is punishable with imprisonment. On the
other hand, a second law m specifies that resisting arrest has the same effect. The execution e of
a sentence establishes that a punishment implies imprisonment. Suppose that some person drove
drunk and resisted to be arrested. 
We can capture this scenario with the following logic program P1:
l : punish← drive, drunk m : punish← resist e : prison← punish
d : drive k : drunk r : resist
The least model of this positive program makes atom prison true, so we know that there exists a
possible derivation for it. In particular, two alternative justifications can be made, corresponding
to the graphs in Figure 1(a): driving drunk and, independently, resisting to authority (vertices and
edges respectively corresponds with rule labels and their dependences).
More specifically, we summarise our contributions as follows.
• We define a multi-valued semantics for (normal) logic programs based on causal graphs.
An important result is that, despite of this semantic nature, we are able to show that causal
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(b) Reflexive, transitive closures
Fig. 1. Derivations G1 and G2 justifying atom prison in program P1.
values have a direct correspondence to (relevant) syntactic proofs using the program rules
involved in the graphs (cf. Section 4).
• We also define an ordering relation that specifies when a cause is stronger than another, and
show how causal values form a lattice with three associated algebraic operations: a product
‘∗’ representing conjunction or joint causation; a sum ‘+’ representing alternative causes;
and a non-commutative product ‘·’ that stands for rule application. We study beneficial
properties of these operations that allow manipulating and reasoning with causal values in
an analytical way (cf. Sections 2 and 3).
Fostered by its algebraic treatment of causal values, our work facilitates the incorporation of
dedicated, more specific causal expressions representing causal influence of different kinds.
2 Causes as graphs
In this and subsequent Section 3, we introduce the lattice of causal values in two different steps.
In a first step, we focus on the idea of an “individual” cause and then we proceed to explain the
concept of causal value that allows collecting different alternative causes.
We begin recalling several graph definitions and notation. A (directed) graph is a pair 〈V,E〉
where V is a set of vertices V and E is a set of edges E ⊆V ×V . In the following definitions, let
G = 〈V,E〉 and G′ = 〈V ′,E ′〉 be two graphs. We say that G is a subgraph of G′, written G⊆ G′,
when V ⊆V ′ and E ⊆E ′. We write G∪G′ to stand for the graph 〈V ∪V ′,E∪E ′〉. We represent the
reflexive and transitive closure of G as G∗. Finally, we introduce a concatenation operation GG′
on graphs corresponding to a graph with vertices V ∪V ′ and edges E∪E ′∪{(x,y) | x∈V,y∈V ′}.
Notice that, G∪G′ ⊆GG′, that is, the concatenation extends the union of graphs by adding all
possible arcs that go from some node in G to some node in G′.
Definition 1 (Causal graph)
Given some set Lb of (rule) labels, a causal graph (c-graph) G is a reflexively and transitively
closed directed graph, i.e., G∗ = G, whose vertices are labels, i.e. V ⊆ Lb. We denote by CLb the
set of all possible causal graphs over Lb. 
Intuitively, the vertices correspond to rules involved in a derivation of a given atom (or formula),
and the edges point out a (partial) ordering of application of rules in the derivation. Figure 1(a)
shows two causal graphs with labels from P1. Transitivity is crucial for interpreting the subgraph
relation G⊆ G′ as a way to express that G′ is redundant with respect to G. For instance, a graph
G3 formed by the single edge (r,e) is not a subgraph of G2 but is simpler (does not require us-
ing m). This fact is captured by G∗3 ⊆ G∗2. Reflexivity is convenient for simpler definitions. For
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instance, the causal graph formed by a single label l also has a single edge (l, l)—we call this
an atomic causal graphs and represent it just by its label. For simplicity, we will usually omit
transitive and reflexive arcs when depicting a causal graph. For instance, taking G1 and G2 in
Figure 1(a) as causal graphs actually amounts to considering the graphs shown in Figure 1(b),
where previously omitted arcs are shown as dotted lines. We define next a natural ordering rela-
tion among them.
Definition 2 (Sufficient)
A causal graph G is sufficient for another causal graph G′, written G≤ G′, when G⊇ G′. 
Saying that G is sufficient for G′ intuitively means that G contains enough information to yield
the same effect than G′, but perhaps more than needed (this explains G ⊇ G′). For this reason,
we sometimes read G≤ G′ as “G′ is stronger than G.”
Since graphs with the subgraph relation form a poset, the set of causal graphs also constitutes
a poset 〈CLb,≤〉 with a top element corresponding to the empty c-graph G /0 = 〈 /0, /0〉. This stands
for a kind of “absolute truth” and is of interest for including rules or facts one does not want to
label, that is, their effect will not be traced in the justifications.
Any causal graph can be built up from labels (atomic causal graphs) using two basic opera-
tions: the product G∗G′ def= (G∪G′)∗ that stands for union of causal graphs or joint interaction,
and the concatenation G ·G′ def= (GG′)∗ that captures their sequential application. The reason
for applying a closure is that the result of G∪G′ and GG′ does not need to be closed under
transitivity. We can extend the product to any (possibly empty and possibly infinite) set of causal
graphs S so that ∏S def=
( ⋃
G∈S G
)∗.
Example 2 (Ex. 1 continued)
The cause for the body of l in P1 is the product of causes for drive and drunk, that is d ∗ k
formed with vertices {d,k} and edges {(d,d),(k,k)}. As a result, the explanation of the rule
head, punish, is formed by the concatenation of its body cause d ∗k with its label, that is (d ∗k) · l.
In its turn, this becomes the cause for the body of e and so, we get the explanation (d ∗ k) · l · e
for atom prison represented as G1 in Figure 1(b). Similarly, G2 corresponds to r ·m · e. 
When writing these causal expressions, we assume that ‘·’ has higher priority than ‘∗’. Fur-
thermore, we will usually omit ‘·’ when applied to consecutive labels, so that r ·m · e will be
abbreviated as rme. It is easy to see that G ∗G′ = G′ ∗G while, in general, G ·G′ 6= G′ ·G, that
is, concatenation is not commutative. Another observation is that G ·G′ ≤ G ∗G′, that is, con-
catenation is sufficient for the product, but the opposite does not hold in general. Moreover, in
our running example, we can check that (d ∗ k) · l is equal to (d · l) ∗ (k · l). In fact, application
distributes over products and, as a result, we can identify any causal graph with the product of all
its edges. To conclude this section, we note that the set of causal graphs CLb ordered by ≤ forms
a lower semilattice 〈CLb,∗〉, where the product constitutes the infimum.
3 Alternative causes
Having settled the case for individual causes, let us now proceed to represent situations in which
several alternative and independent causes can be found for an atom p. The obvious possibility
is just using a set of causal graphs for that purpose. However, we should additionally disregard
causes for which a stronger alternative exists. For instance, as we saw before, cause rme is suf-
ficient for explaining punish and therefore, it is also an alternative way to prove this atom, but
redundant in the presence of the stronger cause rm. This suggests to choose sets of ≤-maximal
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causal graphs as ‘truth values’ for our multi-valued semantics. In principle, this is the central idea,
although≤-maximal causal graphs incur some minor inconveniences in mathematical treatment.
For instance, if we collect different alternative causes by just using the union of sets of maximal
causal graphs, the elements in the result need not be maximal. Besides, the operations of product
and concatenation are expected to extend to the sets adopted as causal values. To address these
issues, a more solid representation is obtained resorting to ideals of causal graphs.
Given any poset 〈A,≤〉, an ideal I is any set I ⊆ A satisfying1: if x ∈ I and y ≤ x then y ∈ I.
A compact way of representing an ideal I is by using its set of maximal elements S, since the
rest of I contains all elements below them. The principal ideal of an individual element x ∈ A
is denoted as ↓ x def= {y ∈ A | y ≤ x}. We extend this notion for any set of elements S so that
↓ S def= ⋃{↓ x | x ∈ S}= {y ∈ A | y≤ x, for some x ∈ S}. Thus, we will usually represent an ideal
I as ↓ S where S are the maximal 2 elements in I. In fact, maximal elements constitute the relevant
information provided by the ideal, while keeping all other elements is convenient for simplicity
of algebraic treament (but we do not assign a particular meaning to them).
Definition 3 (Causal Value)
Given a set of labels Lb, a causal value is any ideal for the poset 〈CLb,≤〉. We denote by VLb the
set of causal values. 
Product, concatenation and the ≤-relation are easily extended to any pair U , U ′ of causal values
respectively as: U ∗U ′ def= U ∩U ′ and U ·U ′ def= ↓{ G ·G′ ∣∣ G ∈U and G′ ∈U ′ } and U ≤U ′ iff
U ⊆ U ′. We also define addition as: U +U ′ def= U ∪U ′ allowing to collect alternative causes.
Using terminology and results from lattice theory in (Stumme 1997) we can prove the following.
Theorem 1
VLb forms a free, completely distributive lattice with join + and meet ∗ generated by the lower
semilattice 〈CLb,∗〉 with the injective homomorphism (or embedding) ↓: CLb −→ VLb . 
Essentially, this theorem means that the mapping ↓ from c-graph G to its principal ideal ↓G is pre-
served for their respective products, ↓(G1 ∗G2) =↓G1 ∗ ↓G2, and ordering relations: G1 ≤ G2
(among c-graphs) iff ↓G1 ≤ ↓G2 (among causal values).
Example 3 (Ex. 1 continued)
The interpretation for punish has two alternative causes (d ∗ k) · l and rm that become the causal
values ↓(d ∗ k) · l and ↓rm. The causal value for punish is then formed by their addition:
↓(d ∗ k) · l + ↓rm = ↓(d ∗ k) · l ∪ ↓rm = ↓{ (d ∗ k) · l, rm }
This ideal contains, among others, the cause rme, although it is not maximal due to rm:
↓{ (d ∗ k) · l, rm } ∪ ↓rme = ↓{ (d ∗ k) · l, rm, rme} = ↓{ (d ∗ k) · l, rm } 
The term completely distributive lattice in Theorem 1 means that meet (resp. join) operation is
defined for any infinite subset of VLb and distributes over infinite joins (resp. meets). There is also
a bottom element, the empty ideal /0 (standing for “falsity”) that will be denoted as 0, and a top
element, the ideal formed by the empty causal graph ↓G /0 = CLb (standing for “absolute truth”)
that is denoted as 1 from now on. To improve readability, we introduce the syntactic notion of
causal terms, that allow representing the possible causal values without explicitly resorting to
graphs or ideals.
1 We use terminology from (Stumme 1997). In some texts this is known as semi-ideal or down-set to differentiate this
definition from the stronger case in which ideals are applied on a (full) lattice rather than a semi-lattice.
2 Note that, in the case of causal graphs, the existence of maximal elements for the ≤-relation amounts to the existence
of minimal elements for the subgraph relation, and this holds since the latter is well-founded.
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Definition 4 (Causal term)
A (causal) term, t, over a set of labels Lb, is recursively defined as one of the following expres-
sions t ::= l | ∏S | ∑S | t1 ·t2 where l ∈ Lb, t1, t2 are in their turn causal terms and S is a (possibly
empty and possible infinite) set of causal terms. When S is finite and non-empty, S = {t1, . . . , tn}
we write ∏S simply as t1 ∗ · · · ∗ tn and ∑S as t1+ · · ·+ tn. 
We assume that ‘∗’ has higher priority than ‘+’. The causal value associated to a causal term is
naturally obtained by the recursive application of its operators until we reach the level of labels,
so that each label l in the term actually stands for the principal ideal ↓ l. When S = /0, the union
in S corresponds to the bottom causal value that is, ∑ /0 = 0. Analogously, the intersection of
elements in S = /0 corresponds to top causal value, i.e., ∏ /0 = 1.
From now on, we will use causal terms as compact representations of causal values. Individual
causes (i.e. causal graphs) correspond to terms without addition (note that this also excludes 0,
the empty sum). Several interesting algebraic properties can be proved for causal values. In par-
ticular, Theorem 1 guarantees that they form a free completely distributive lattice with respect to
‘∗’ and ‘+’ satisfying the standard properties such as associativity, commutativity, idempotence,
absorption or distributivity on both directions3. Besides, as usual, 0 (resp. 1) is the annihilator
for ‘∗’ (resp. ‘+’) and the identity for ‘+’ (resp. ‘∗’). More significantly, the main properties for
‘·’ are shown in Figure 2.
Associativity
t · (u·w) = (t·u) · w
Absorption
t = t + u · t · w
u · t · w = t ∗ u · t · w
Identity
t = 1 · t
t = t · 1
Annihilator
0 = t · 0
0 = 0 · t
Indempotence
l · l = l
Addition distributivity
t · (u+w) = (t·u) + (t·w)
(t + u) · w = (t·w) + (u·w)
Product distributivity
c ·d · e = (c ·d)∗ (d · e) with d 6= 1
c · (d ∗ e) = (c ·d)∗ (c · e)
(c∗d) · e = (c · e)∗ (d · e)
Fig. 2. Properties of the ‘·’ operator (c,d,e are terms without ‘+’ and l is a label).
4 Positive programs and minimal models
Let us now reconsider logic programs and provide a semantics based on the causal values we
have just defined. For the syntax, we recall standard LP definitions, just slightly extending it
by introducing rule labels. A signature is a pair 〈At,Lb〉 of sets that respectively represent a
set of atoms (or propositions) and a set of labels. As usual, a literal is defined as an atom p
(positive literal) or its default negation not p (negative literal). In this paper, we will concentrate
on programs without disjunction in the head (leaving its treatment for future work).
Definition 5 (Causal logic program)
Given a signature 〈At,Lb〉, a (causal) logic program P is a (possible infinite) set of rules of the
form:
t : H← B1, . . . ,Bn, (1)
where t ∈ Lb∪{1}, H is an atom (the head of the rule) and B1, . . . ,Bn are literals (the body). 
For any rule R of the form (1) we define label(R) def= t. We denote by head(R) def= H its head,
and by body(R) def= {B1, . . . ,Bn} its body. When n = 0 we say that the rule is a fact and omit the
symbol ‘←.’ When t ∈ Lb we say that the rule is labelled; otherwise t = 1 and we omit both t
3 The term “free lattice” in Theorem 1 means that any equivalence with ∗ and + can be derived from these properties.
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and ‘:’. By these conventions, for instance, an unlabelled fact p is actually an abbreviation of
(1 : p←). A logic program P is positive if it contains no default negation. A program is uniquely
labelled if no pair of labelled rules share the same label, and completely labelled if, additionally,
all rules are labelled. For instance, P1 is completely labelled.
Given a signature 〈At,Lb〉 a causal interpretation is a mapping I : At −→ VLb assigning a
causal value to each atom. For any interpretations I, J, we say that I ≤ J when I(p) ≤ J(p) for
each atom p ∈ At. Hence, there is a ≤-bottom (resp. ≤-top) interpretation 0 (resp. 1) that stands
for the interpretation mapping each atom p to 0 (resp. 1). The value assigned to a negative literal
not p by an interpretation I, denoted as I(not p), is defined as: I(not p) def= 1 if I(p) = 0; and
I(not p) def= 0 otherwise. An interpretation is two-valued if it maps all atoms to {0,1}. Further-
more, for any causal interpretation, its corresponding two-valued interpretation, written Icl , is
defined so that for any atom p: Icl(p) def= 0 if I(p) = 0; and Icl(p) def= 1 otherwise.
Definition 6 (Causal model)
Given a positive causal logic program P, a causal interpretation I is a causal model, in symbols
I |= P, if and only if, for each rule R ∈ P of the form (1), the following condition holds:(
I(B1)∗ . . .∗ I(Bn)
) · t ≤ I(H) 
Example 4 (Ex. 1 continued)
Take rule l from program P1 and let I be such that I(drive) = d and I(drunk) = k. Then I will be a
model of l when (d∗k) · l≤ I(punish). In particular, this holds when I(punish) = (d ∗ k) · l+ r ·m
which was the value we expected for that atom. But it would also hold when, for instance,
I(punish) = l +m or I(punish) = 1. The inequality in Definition 6 is important to accommo-
date possible additional facts such as (l : punish) or even (1 : punish) in the program. 
The fact that any I(punish) greater than (d ∗k) · l+ r ·m also becomes a model clearly points out
the need for selecting minimal models. In fact, as it is the case for non-causal programs, positive
programs have a≤-least model that can be computed by iterating an extension of the well-known
direct consequences operator (van Emden and Kowalski 1976).
Definition 7 (Direct consequences)
Given a positive logic program P over signature 〈At,Lb〉, the operator of direct consequences is
a function TP : I−→ I such that, for any causal interpretation I and any atom p ∈ At:
TP(I)(p)
def= ∑
{ (
I(B1)∗ . . .∗ I(Bn)
) · t | (t : p← B1, . . . ,Bn) ∈ P }
Theorem 2
Let P be a (possibly infinite) positive logic program with n causal rules. Then, (i) lfp(TP) is the
least model of P, and (ii) lfp(TP) = TP ↑ ω (0) = TP ↑ n (0). 
The proof of this theorem relies on an encoding of causal logic programs into Generalized Anno-
tated Logic Programming (GAP) (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992) and applying existing results
for that general multi-valued LP framework. Theorem 2 just guarantees that the least fixpoint of
TP is well-behaved, but does not explain the nature of the obtained causal values. We illustrate
next that these values have a direct relation to the syntactic idea of proof in a positive program.
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Definition 8
Given a positive program P, a proof pi(p) of an atom p can be recursively defined as a derivation:
pi(p) def=
pi(B1) . . . pi(Bn)
p
(R),
where R ∈ P is a rule with head(R) = p and body(R) = {B1, . . . ,Bn}. When n= 0, the derivation
antecedent pi(B1) . . . pi(Bn) is replaced by > (corresponding to the empty body). 
Each derivation in a proof is a particular application of Modus Ponens where, once the body
(conjunction of literals B) of a rule R (p← B) has been proved, then the head p can be concluded.
>
drive
(d)
>
drunk
(k)
punish
(l)
prison
(e)
>
resist
(r)
punish
(m)
prison
(e)
>
drive
(d)
>
drunk
(k)
punish
(l)
sentence
(s)
punish
(n)
prison
(e)
Fig. 3. Some proofs for atom prison (the rightmost proof is redundant).
Example 5 (Ex. 1 continued)
Program P1 is positive and, in fact, completely labelled, so we can identify each rule with its
label. Atom prison can be derived in P1 using the two proofs on the left in Figure 3. These two
proofs have a clear correspondence to causes (d ∗ k) · le and rme depicted in Figure 1(b). In fact,
the least model I of P1 assigns causal value I(punish) = (d ∗ k) · le+ rme. 
Let P be a positive, completely labelled program. Given a proof pi , we define its graph Gpi as
follows. For each sub-derivation in pi of the form pi(p) in Definition 8 we include an edge (li,m)
where m is the label of rule R and li is the label of the top-level rule in pi(Bi), for all i = 1, . . . ,n.
The vertices in Gpi exclusively collect the labels in those edges. We define graph(pi) def= G∗pi . The
two left proofs in Figure 3 are then obviously mapped to the causal graphs in Figure 1(b). If Π is
a set of proofs, we define graph(Π) def= {graph(pi) | pi ∈Π}.
A proof can be sometimes redundant, in the sense that some of its derivation steps could be
removed. A natural way of defining a non-redundant proof is resorting to its associated graph.
We say that a proof pi(p) of an atom p in a positive, completely labelled program P is redundant
if there exists another proof of p, pi ′(p), such that graph(pi(p))≤ graph(pi ′(p)), in other words,
we can build another proof pi ′ with a smaller associated graph.
Example 6
Suppose that we introduce an atom sentence which acts as a synonym for punish. Furthermore,
assume law m mentions sentence as its head now, instead of punish. Hence, let P2 be program:
l : punish← drive,drunk d : drive n : punish← sentence
m : sentence← resist k : drunk s : sentence← punish
e : prison← punish r : resist
Then, the rightmost proof shown in Figure 3 together with its associated graph (d ∗ k) · lsne is
redundant, since the (still valid) leftmost proof in Figure 3 for prison has an associated stronger
cause (or smaller graph) (d ∗ k) · le. Considering the positive loop formed by n and s, one may
wonder why it does not spoil the computation of TP2 to iterate forever (adding more and more
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concatenations of n and s). The reason is that, at a given point, subsequent iterations yield redun-
dant graphs subsumed by previous steps. In particular, the iteration of TP2 yields the steps:
i drive drunk resist sentence punish prison
1 d k r 0 0 0
2 d k r rm (d ∗ k) · l 0
3 d k r rm+(d ∗ k) · ls (d ∗ k) · l+ rmn (d ∗ k) · le
4 d k r rm+(d ∗ k) · ls (d ∗ k) · l+ rmn ((d ∗ k) · l+ rmn) · e
reaching a fixpoint at step 4. The value for sentence at step 4 would actually be the sum of rm
(derived from resist) with the value of punish in the previous step, (d ∗k) · l+ rmn followed by s.
This corresponds to:
rm+((d ∗ k) · l+ rmn︸ ︷︷ ︸
punish
) · s = rm+(d ∗ k) · ls+ rmns distributivity
= rm+ rmns+(d ∗ k) · ls commutativity
= rm+ rm ·ns+(d ∗ k) · ls associativity
= rm+1 · rm ·ns+(d ∗ k) · ls identity
= rm+(d ∗ k) · ls absorption for ‘+’ and ‘·’
That is, iterating the loop rmns is redundant since a stronger cause rm was obtained before. 
Theorem 3
Let P be a positive, completely labelled program, and Πp the set of non-redundant proofs of
some atom p with respect to P. If I denotes the least model of P, then:
G ∈ graph(Πp) iff G is a maximal causal graph in I(p) 
Note the importance of this result: it reveals that the information we obtain by a purely semantic
treatment of causal values (computing the least model by algebraic operations) has a one-to-one
correspondence to syntactic proofs obtained by modus ponens that are further guaranteed to be
non-redundant (they do not contain unnecessary steps). Completely labelled programs are inter-
esting for establishing the correspondence in the theorem above, but there are several scenarios
in which one may be interested in disregarding the effect of rules in a program or in identifying
a group of rules under the same label.
Example 7
Let P3 be the following variation of P2:
z : sentence← drive,drunk d : drive punish← sentence
z : punish← resist k : drunk sentence← punish
e : prison← punish r : resist
where l and m in P2 are now just two cases of a common law z, and punish and sentence depend
on each other through unlabelled rules. 
Removing the labels in the positive cycle between sentence and punish captures the idea that,
since they are synonyms, whenever we have a cause for sentence, it immediately becomes a
cause for punish and vice versa. By iterating the TP operator, it is not difficult to see that the
least causal model I3 makes the assignments I3(sentence) = I3(punish) = (d ∗ k) · z+ rz (that is
sentence and punish are equivalent) and I3(prison) = (d ∗ k) · ze+ rze. This result could also be
computed from the least model I2 for P2 by replacing l and m by z and “removing” n and s (that
10 P. Cabalar, J. Fandinno & M. Fink
is, replacing them by 1). This is, in fact, a general property we formalise as follows. Given two
causal terms t,u and a label l, we define t[l 7→ u] as the result of replacing label l in t by term u.
Theorem 4
Let P be a positive causal logic program and P′ be the result of replacing a label l in P by some u,
where u is any label or 1. Furthermore, let I and I′ be the least models of P and P′, respectively.
Then, I′(p) = I(p)[l 7→ u] for any atom p. 
In particular, in our example, I3(p) = I2(p)[l 7→ z][m 7→ z][n 7→ 1][s 7→ 1], for any atom p. If we
remove all labels in a program, we eventually get a standard, unlabelled program. Obviously, its
least model will be two-valued, since removing all labels in causal terms, eventually collapses
all of them to {0,1}. As a result, we can easily establish the following correspondence.
Theorem 5
Let P be a causal positive logic program and P′ its unlabelled version. Furthermore, let I be the
least causal model of P and I′ the least classical model of P′. Then I′ = Icl . 
5 Default negation
To introduce default negation, let us consider the following variation of our running example.
Example 8
Assume now that law e is a default and that there may be exceptional cases in which punishment
is not effective. In particular, some of such exceptions are a pardon, that the punishment was
revoked, or that the person has diplomatic immunity. A possible program P4 encoding this variant
of the scenario is:
l : punish← drive,drunk d : drive abnormal← pardon
m : punish← resist k : drunk abnormal← revoke
e : prison← punish,not abnormal r : resist abnormal← diplomat
This program has a unique stable model which still keeps prison true, since no proof for abnormal
could be obtained, i.e. no exception occurred. 
From a causal perspective, saying that the lack of an exception is part of a cause (e.g., for impris-
onment) is rather counterintuitive. It is not the case that we go to prison because of not receiving
a pardon, not having a punishment revocation, not being a diplomat, or whatever possible excep-
tion that might be added in the future4. Instead, as nothing violated default e, the justifications
for prison should be those shown in Figure 1(a). In this way, falsity becomes the default situation
that is broken when a cause is found5. This interpretation carries over to negative literals, so that
the presence of not p in a rule body does not propagate causal information, but instead is a check
for the absence of an exception. To capture this behaviour, we proceed to extend the traditional
program reduct (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) to causal logic programs.
4 A case of the well-known qualification problem (McCarthy 1977), i.e., the impossibility of listing all the possible
conditions that prevent an action to cause a given effect. Appendix B (available online) contains a more elaborated
example showing how the qualification problem may affect causal explanations when inertia is involved.
5 The paper (Hitchcock and Knobe 2009) contains an extended discussion with several examples showing how people
ordinarily understand causes as deviations from a norm.
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Definition 9 (Program reduct)
The reduct of program P with respect to causal interpretation I, in symbols PI , is the result of:
1. removing from P all rules R, s.t. I(B) 6= 0 for some negative literal B ∈ body(R);
2. removing all negative literals from the remaining rules of P. 
An interpretation I is a causal stable model of program P iff I is the least causal model of PI .
Example 9 (Ex. 8 continued)
Suppose that we add atoms (p : pardon) and (d : diplomat) to program P4. The only stable model
I of this extended program makes I(prison) = 0 and I(abnormal) = p+d as expected. 
Theorem 6 (Correspondence to non-causal stable models)
Let P be a causal logic program and P′ its unlabelled version. Then:
1. If I is a causal stable model of P, then Icl is a stable model of P′.
2. If I′ is a stable model of P′ then there is a unique causal stable model I of P s.t. I′ = Icl . 
This theorem also shows a possible method for computing causal stable models of a program
P. We may first run a standard ASP solver on the unlabelled version of P to obtain a stable
model I′. This stable model I′ has a corresponding causal stable model I, such that I′ = Icl and
both interpretations coincide in their assignment of 0’s. Therefore, PI = PI
′
and we can use
the latter to iterate the TP operator and obtain the least causal model of this reduct, which will
mandatorily be a causal stable model due to Theorem 6.
6 Related Work
Cabalar (2011) already introduced the main motivations of our work, but used ad hoc opera-
tions on proof trees without resorting to algebraic structures. A preliminary version (Cabalar
and Fandinno 2013) of the current approach relied on chains of labels but was actually weaker,
missing basic properties we can derive now from causal graphs.
There exists a vast literature on causal reasoning in Artificial Intelligence. Papers on reasoning
about actions and change (Lin 1995; McCain and Turner 1997; Thielscher 1997) have been
traditionally focused on using causal inference to solve representational problems (mostly, the
frame, ramification and qualification problems) without paying much attention to the derivation
of cause-effect relations. Perhaps the most established AI approach for causality is relying on
causal networks (Pearl 2000; Halpern and Pearl 2005; Halpern 2008). In this approach, it is
possible to conclude cause-effect relations like “A has caused B” from the behaviour of structural
equations by applying the counterfactual interpretation from Hume (1748): “had A not happened,
B would not have happened.” As discussed by Hall (2004), the counterfactual-based definition
of causation corresponds to recognising some kind of dependence relation in the behaviour of a
non-causal system description. As opposed to this, Hall considers a different (and incompatible)
definition where causes must be connected to their effects via sequences of causal intermediates,
something that is closer to our explanations in terms of causal graphs.
Apart from the different AI approaches and attitudes towards causality, from the technical
point of view, the current approach can be classified as a labelled deductive system (Broda et al.
2004). In particular, the work that has had a clearest and most influential relation to the current
proposal is the Logic of Proofs (LP) by Arte¨mov (2001). We have borrowed from that formalism
part of the notation for our causal terms and rule labellings and the fundamental idea of keeping
track of justifications by considering rule applications.
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Focusing on LP, our work obviously relates to explanations as provided by approaches to de-
bugging in ASP (Gebser et al. 2008; Pontelli et al. 2009; Schulz et al. 2013; Dama´sio et al. 2013).
Pereira et al. (1991) and Denecker and De Schreye (1993) also define different semantics in terms
of justifications, but do not provide calculi for them. In these works, explanations usually contain
all possible ways to derive an atom or to prevent its derivation, including paths through negation.
This differs from a KR orientation where only the cause-effect relations that “break the norm”
should be considered relevant. This point of view is also shared, e.g., by the counterfactual-
based causal LP approach (Vennekens 2011). Fages (1991) characterised stable models in terms
of loop-free justifications expressed as partial order relations among atoms in positive bodies. We
conjecture that the causal values obtained in our semantics formally capture Fages’ justifications.
A more far-fetched resemblance exists to work on the analysis of tabled Prolog computations.
There, the goal is to identify potential causes for non-termination of program evaluations, which
can be achieved examining so-called forest logs, i.e., a log of table operations for a computation.
By adding unique labels for rules (with the original intention to disambiguate analysis results,
cf. Liang and Kifer (2013), however not as an explicit means for representing knowledge), in
principle a forest log implicitly contains the information necessary to read of the causal model
of a completely labelled positive causal logic program.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a multi-valued semantics for normal logic programs whose truth
values form a lattice of causal graphs. A causal graph is nothing else but a graph of rule la-
bels that reflects some order of rule applications. In this way, a model assigns to each true
atom a value that contains justifications for its derivation from the existing rules. We have fur-
ther provided three basic operations on the lattice: an addition, that stands for alternative, in-
dependent justifications; a product, that represents joint interaction of causes; and a concate-
nation that reflects rule application. We have shown that, for positive programs, there exists a
least model that coincides with the least fixpoint of a direct consequences operator, analogous
to van Emden and Kowalski (1976). With this, we are able to prove a direct correspondence be-
tween the semantic values we obtain and the syntactic idea of proof. These results have been
extrapolated to stable models of programs with default negation, understanding the latter as “ab-
sence of cause.” Although, for space reasons, we have not dealt with programs with variables,
their semantics is obtained from their (possibly infinite) grounding, as usual.
Several topics remain open for future study. An interesting issue is to replace the syntactic def-
inition by a reduct in favour of a logical treatment of default negation, as has been done for (non-
causal) stable models and their characterisation in terms of Equilibrium Logic (Pearce 2006).
Regarding the representation of causal information, a natural next step would be the considera-
tion of syntactic operators for more specific knowledge like the influence of a particular event
or label in a conclusion, expressing necessary or sufficient causes, or even dealing with coun-
terfactuals. Further ongoing work is focused on implementation, complexity assessment, and an
extension to disjunctive programs, respectively the introduction of strong negation. Exploring
related areas of KR and reasoning, such as, e.g., Paraconsistent Reasoning and Belief Revision,
seems promising with respect to extending the range of problems to which our approach may
effectively be applied.
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Appendix A. Auxiliary figures
Associativity
t + (u+w) = (t+u) + w
t ∗ (u∗w) = (t ∗u) ∗ w
Commutativity
t + u = u + t
t ∗ u = u ∗ t
Absorption
t = t + (t ∗u)
t = t ∗ (t+u)
Distributive
t + (u∗w) = (t+u) ∗ (t+w)
t ∗ (u+w) = (t ∗u) + (t ∗w)
Identity
t = t + 0
t = t ∗ 1
Idempotence
t = t + t
t = t ∗ t
Annihilator
1 = 1 + t
0 = 0 ∗ t
Fig. 4. Sum and product satisfy the properties of a completely distributive lattice.
Appendix B. An example of causal action theory
In this section we consider a more elaborated example from Pearl (2000).
Example 10
Consider the circuit in Figure 5 with two switches, a and b, and a lamp l. Note that a is the main
switch, while b only affects the lamp when a is up. Additionally, when the light is on, we want
to track which wire section, v or w, is conducting current to the lamp. 
As commented by Pearl (2000), the interesting feature of this circuit is that, seen from outside
as a black box, it behaves exactly as a pair of independent, parallel switches, so it is impossible
to detect the causal dependence between a and b by a mere observation of performed actions and
their effects on the lamp. Figure 5 also includes a possible representation for this scenario; let us
call it program P5. It uses a pair of fluents up(X) and down(X) for the position of switch X , as
well as on and off to represent the state of the lamp. Fluents up(X) and down(X) (respectively,
on and off) can be seen as the strong negation of each other, although we do not use an operator
for that purpose6. Action m(X ,D) stands for “move switch X in direction D ∈ {u,d}” (up and
down, respectively). Actions between state t and t +1 are located in the resulting state. Finally,
we have also labelled inertia laws (by i) to help keeping track of fluent justifications inherited by
persistence.
Suppose we perform the following sequence of actions: we first move down both switches,
next switch b is moved first up and then down, and finally we move up switch a. Assume also
that each action occurrence is labelled with the action name so that, for instance, moving b up
in Situation 1 corresponds to the program fact m(b,u)1 : m(b,u)1. The table in Figure 6 shows
the resulting temporal projection. Note how the lamp turns on in Situation 1 but only because
of v, that is, moving a down. Movements of b at 2 and 3 do not affect the lamp, and its causal
explanation (down(a)) is maintained by inertia. In Situation 4, the lamp is still on but the reason
has changed. The explanation this time is that we had closed down b at 3 (and this persisted by
inertia) while we have just moved a up, firing rule w.
This example also illustrates why we are not interested in providing negative justifications through
default negation. This would mean to explicitly include non-occurrences of actions that might
6 Notice how strong negation would point out the cause(s) for a boolean fluent to take value false, whereas default
negation represents the absence of cause.
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Circuit diagram
light
sw(2)
sw(1)
Inertia
i : up(X)t+1 ← up(X)t , not down(X)t+1
i : down(X)t+1 ← down(X)t , not up(X)t+1
Direct effects
up(X)t ← m(X ,u)t
down(X)t ← m(X ,d)t
Causal rules (indirect effects)
v : ont ← down(a)t
w : ont ← up(a)t , down(b)t
offt ← up(a)t , up(b)t
Constraints
⊥ ← m(X ,u)t , m(X ,d)t
⊥ ← up(X)t , down(X)t
⊥ ← ont , offt
Initial state
up(a)0 up(b)0 off0
Fig. 5. A circuit with two switches together with a possible representation.
t 0 1 2 3 4
Actions m(a,d)1, m(b,d)1 m(b,u)2 m(b,d)3 m(a,u)4
up(a)t 1 0 0 0 m(a,u)4
down(a)t 0 m(a,d)1 m(a,d)1 · i m(a,d)1 · i 0
up(b)t 1 0 m(b,u)2 0 0
down(b)t 0 m(b,d)1 0 m(b,d)3 m(b,d)3 · i
ont 0 m(a,d)1 · v m(a,d)1 · iv m(a,d)1 · iv ( m(b,d)3 · i∗m(a,u)4 ) ·w
offt 1 0 0 0 0
Fig. 6. Temporal projection of a sequence of actions for program P5.
otherwise have violated inertia. For instance, the explanation for on2 would include the fact that
we did not perform m(a,u)2. Including this information for one transition is perhaps not so cum-
bersome, but suppose that, from 2 we executed a high number of transitions without performing
any action. The explanation for on3 would additionally collect that we did not perform m(a,u)3
either. The explanation for on4 should also collect the negation of further possibilities: moving a
up at 4; three movements of a up, down and up; moving b at 3 and both switches at 4; moving
both switches at 3 and b at 4; etc. It is easy to see that negative explanations grow exponentially:
at step t we would get the negation of all possible plans for making ont false, while indeed,
nothing has actually happened (everything persisted by inertia).
Example 11 (The gear wheels)
Consider a gear mechanism with a pair of wheels, each one powered by a separate motor. Each
motor has a switch to start and stop it. There is another switch to connect or disconnect the
wheels. (McCain 1997). 
This example can be captured by the logic program P6 formed by the following causal rules:
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motor(W )t ← start(W )t
¬motor(W )t ← stop(W )t
turn(W )t ← motor(W )t
coupledt ← couplet
¬coupledt ← uncouplet
turn(1)t ← turn(2)t , coupledt
turn(2)t ← turn(1)t , coupledt
¬turn(1)t ← ¬turn(2)t , coupledt
¬turn(2)t ← ¬turn(1)t , coupledt
plus the fhe following inertia axioms:
motor(W )t+1← motor(W )t , not ¬motor(W )t+1
¬motor(W )t+1← ¬motor(W )t , not motor(W )t+1
turn(W )t+1 ← turn(W )t , not ¬turn(W )t+1 (2)
¬turn(W )t+1 ← ¬turn(W )t , not turn(W )t+1
coupledt+1 ← coupledt , not ¬coupledt+1
¬coupledt+1 ← ¬coupledt , not coupledt+1
Suppose that initially both motors are off an the wheels are immobile. This is reflected by the
following set of facts
{ ¬motor(1)0, ¬motor(2)0, ¬turn(1)0, ¬turn(2)0, ¬cuopled0 }. Then
we perform the following actions
{
s(1)3 : start(1)3, c6 : couple6, u9 : uncouple9
}
. Figure 7(a)
shows the causal values associated with each fluent in each time interval. Note that we only have
labelled the actions avoiding tracing rule application for clearity sake. This example illustrates the
behaviour of causal logic programs in the presence of causal cycles. When no action is performed
the value of a fluent is just propagate by inertia.
An iteresting variation of this example is incorporating some mechanic device to stop the
wheels (Van Belleghem et al. 1998; Lin and Soutchanski 2011). This can be achived by adding
the following set of rules:
breaked(W )t ← break(W )t
¬breaked(W )t ← unbreak(W )t
¬turn(W )t ← breaked(W )t
breaked(W )t+1← breaked(W )t , not ¬breaked(W )t+1
¬breaked(W )t+1← ¬breaked(W )t , not breaked(W )t+1
If the second wheel is breaked at s9 we will get insted that turn(2)9 is false an the cause of
¬turn(2)t in any future situation is break(2)9. Another interesiting situations is when we break
the second wheel in the situation 5. In such case we have an incosistence. On the one hand the
cause of turn(1)6 and turn(2)6 are respectively s1 and s(1)3 ∗ c(6). On the other hand the cause
of ¬turn(1)6 and ¬turn(2)6 are respectively break(2)5 ∗ c(6) and break(2)5. Note that, causal
values not only points the existence of an incosistence but also can be explaoited to explain why.
In particual, in this case, the motor forces the wheels to spin whereas the break opposed to it.
Another iteresting variation of this example is assuming that wheels are breaked by friction as
soon as the motriz force over them is absent. This can be achived by just replacing the inertia
axiom (2) for turn by the following causal rule:
f (W )t : ¬turn(W )t+1← not ¬turn(W )t , not turn(W )t+1
Figure 7(b) shows the variation in the causal value of turn(2). Note that ∗ means that the value
is the same as Figure 7(a).
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t 0−2 3−5 6−8 9−
motor(1)t 0 s(1)3 s(1)3 s(1)3
¬motor(1)t 1 0 0 0
coupledt 0 0 c6 0
¬coupledt 1 1 0 u9
turn(1)t 0 s(1)3 s(1)3 s(1)3
¬turn(1)t 1 0 0 0
turn(2)t 0 0 s(1)3 ∗ c6 s(1)3 ∗ c6
¬turn(2)t 1 1 0 0
(a) Innertial turning
t 0−8 9−
motor(1)t ∗ ∗
¬motor(1)t ∗ ∗
coupledt ∗ ∗
¬coupledt ∗ ∗
turn(1)t ∗ ∗
¬turn(1)t ∗ ∗
turn(2)t ∗ 0
¬turn(2)t ∗ f (2)9
(b) Friction brake
Fig. 7. Temporal projection of a sequence of actions for program P6.
Appendix C. Example with infinite rules
Example 12
Consider the infinite program P7 given by the ground instances of the set of rules:
l(s(X)) : nat(s(X))← nat(X)
l(z) : nat(z)
defining the natural numbers with a Peano-like representation, where z stands for “zero.” For
each natural number n, the causal value obtained for nat(sn(z)) in the least model of the program
is l(z) · l(s(z)) . . . l(sn(z)). Read from right to left, this value can be seen as the computation steps
performed by a top-down Prolog interpreter when solving the query nat(sn(z)). As a further
elaboration, assume that we want to check that at least some natural number exists. For that
purpose, we add the following rule to the previous program:
some← nat(X) (3)
The interesting feature of this example is that atom some collects an infinite number of causes
from all atoms nat(sn(z)) with n ranging among all the natural numbers. That is, the value for
some is I(some) = α0+α1+α2+ . . .+αn+ . . . where αn def= l(z) · l(s(z)) · . . . · l(sn(z)). However,
it is easy to see that the fact nat(z) labelled with l(z) is not only sufficient to prove the existence
of some natural number, but, due to the recursive definition of the natural numbers, it is also
necessary – note how all the proofs αi actually begin with an application of l(z).
This fact is captured in our semantic by the algebraic equivalences showed in Fig 2. From
associativity and identity of ‘·’, the following equivalence holds:
αn = 1 · l(z) · βn with βi def= l(s(z)) · . . . · l(si(z))
for any n≥ 1. Furthermore, from absorption of ‘·’ w.r.t the addition, it also holds that
α0+αn = l(z) + 1 · l(z) · βn = l(z)
As a consequence, the previous infinite sum just collapses to I(some) = l(z), reflecting the fact
that, to prove the existence of a natural number, only the fact labelled as l(z) is relevant.
Suppose now that, rather than defining natural numbers in a recursive way, we define them by
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directly asserting an infinite set of facts as follows:
l(sn(z)) : nat(sn(z)) (4)
for any n≥ 0, where s0(z) stands for z. In this variant, the causal value obtained for nat(sn(z)) is
simply l(sn(z)), so that the dependence we had before on lower natural numbers does not exist
any more. Adding rule (3) to the set of facts (4) allows us concluding I(some) = l(z)+ l(s(z))+
l(s2(z))+ . . .+ l(sn(z))+ . . . and this infinite sum cannot be collapsed into any finite term. This
reflects that we have now infinite independent ways to prove that some natural number exists.
This last elaboration can be more elegantly captured by replacing the infinite set of facts (4)
by an auxiliary recursive predicate aux defined as follows:
aux(s(X))← aux(X)
aux(z)
l(X) : nat(X)← aux(X)
Since rules for aux are unlabelled, the value of aux(sn(z)) in the least model is I(aux(sn(z))= 1 so
the effect of this predicate is somehow “transparent” regarding causal justifications. As a result,
the value of nat(sn(z)) is just l(sn(z)) as before.
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Appendix D. Proofs
In order to improve clarity, for any causal graph G = 〈V,E〉, vertices v1 and v2 and edge (v1,v2)
we respectively use the notation v1 ∈ G and (v1,v2) ∈ G instead of v1 ∈V and (v1,v2) ∈ E.
7.1 Causes as graphs
Proposition 1 (Monotonicity)
Let G,G′ be a pair of causal graph with G≤ G′. Then, for any causal graph H:
G∗H ≤ G′ ∗H, G ·H ≤ G′ ·H and H ·G≤ H ·G′
Proof . First we will show that G∗H ≤G′ ∗H. Suppose that E(G∗H) 6⊇ E(G′ ∗H) and let (l1, l2)
be an edge in E(G′ ∗H) but not in E(G∗H ′), i.e. (l1, l2) ∈ E(G′ ∗H)\E(G∗H ′).
Thus, since by product definition E(G′∗H) =E(G′)∪E(H), it follows that either (l1, l2)∈E(G′)
or (l1, l2) ∈ E(H). It is clear that if (l1, l2) ∈ E(H) then (l1, l2) ∈ E(G ∗H) = E(G)∪ E(H).
Furthermore, since G≤ G′ it follows that E(G)⊇ E(G′), if (l1, l2) ∈ E(G′) then (l1, l2) ∈ E(G)
and consequently (l1, l2) ∈ E(G ∗H) = E(G)∪E(H). That is E(G ∗H) ⊇ E(G′ ∗H) and then
G ∗H ≤ G′ ∗H. Note that V (G ∗H) ⊇ V (G′ ∗H) follows directly from E(G ∗H) ⊇ E(G′ ∗H)
and the fact that every vertex has and edge to itself.
To show that G ·H ≤ G′ ·H (the case for H ·G≤ H ·G′ is analogous) we have has to show that,
in addition to the previous, for every edge (lG, lH) ∈ E(G′ ·H) with lG ∈V (G′) and lH ∈V (H) it
holds that (lG, lH) ∈ E(G ·H). Simply note that since G≤ G′ it follows V (G)⊇V (G)′ and then
lG ∈V (G). Consequently (lG, lH) ∈ E(G ·H). 
Proposition 2 (Application associativity for causal graphs)
Let G1, G2 and G3 be three causal graphs. Then G1 · (G2 ·G3) = (G1 ·G2) ·G3.
Proof . By definition, it follows that
V
(
(G1 ·G2) ·G3
)
= (V (G1)∪V (G2))∪V (G3) = V (G1)∪ (V (G2)∪V (G3)) (5)
E
(
(G1 ·G2) ·G3
)
=
(
E(G1)∪E(G2)∪E12
)∪E(G3)∪E12,3
= E(G1)∪E(G2)∪E(G3)∪E12∪E12,3 (6)
E
(
G1 · (G2 ·G3)
)
= E(G1)∪
(
E(G2)∪E(G3)∪E23
)∪E1,23
= E(G1)∪E(G2)∪E(G3)∪E1,23∪E23 (7)
where
E12
def= { (v1,v2)
∣∣ v1 ∈V1 and v2 ∈V2 } E12,3 def= { (v12,v3) ∣∣ v12 ∈V1∪V2 and v3 ∈V3 }
E23
def= { (v2,v3)
∣∣ v2 ∈V2 and v3 ∈V3 } E1,23 def= { (v1,v23) ∣∣ v1 ∈V1 and v23 ∈V2∪V3 }
From (5) and (7), it follows that
(G1 ·G2) ·G3 = G1 · (G2 ·G3) if and only if E12∪E12,3 = E1,23∪E23
if and only if E12,3 ⊆ E1,23∪E23 and E1,23 ⊆ E12∪E12,3
Note that E12 ⊆ E1,23 and E23 ⊆ E12,3. Then, we will show that E12,3 ⊆ E1,23 ∪E23. Suppose
there is an edge (v12,v3) ∈ E12,3 such that (v12,v3) /∈ E23 and (v12,v3) /∈ E1,23. Since (v12,v3),
v12 ∈ V1 ∪V2 and v3 ∈ V3. If v12 ∈ V1, then (v12,v3) ∈ E12,3 which is a contradiction, and if,
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otherwise, v12 ∈V2, then (v12,v3)∈E23 which is also a contradiction. The case E1,23⊆E12∪E12,3
is symmetric.
Proposition 3
For every causal graph G = 〈V,E〉 it holds that G =∏
{
l · l′ ∣∣ (l, l′) ∈ E }.
Proof . Let G′ be a causal graphb s.t. G′ =∏
{
l · l′ ∣∣ (l, l′) ∈ E }. Then for every edge (l, l′) ∈
E(G) it holds that (l, l′)∈ E(l · l′) and then (l, l′)∈ E(G′) =⋃{ E(l · l′) ∣∣ (l, l′)∈ E }, i.e. E(G)⊆
E(G′). Furthermore for every (l, l′) ∈ E(G′) there is li · l j s.t. (l, l′) ∈ li · l j and (li, l j) ∈ E(G).
Then, since E(li · l j) = {(li, l j)} it follows that (l, l′) ∈ E(G), i.e. E(G) ⊇ E(G′). Consequently
G = G′ =∏
{
l · l′ ∣∣ (l, l′) ∈ E }. 
Proposition 4 (Infimum)
Any set of causal graphs S has a ≤-infimum given by their product ∏S.
Proof . By definition ∏S is the causal graph whose vertices and edges are respectively the sets
V (∏S) =
⋃{
V (G)
∣∣ G ∈ S } and E(∏S) = ⋃{ E(G) ∣∣ G ∈ S }. It is easy to see that ∏S is
the supremum of the subgraph relation, so that, since for every pair of causal graphs G ≤ G′ iff
G⊇ G′, it follows that infimum of S w.r.t. ≤. 
Proposition 5 (Application distributivity w.r.t. products over causal graphs)
For every pair of sets of causal graphs S and S′, it holds that(
∏S
) · (∏S′)=∏{ G ·G′ ∣∣ G ∈ S and G′ ∈ S′ }.
Proof . For readability sake, we define two causal graphs
GR
def=
(
∏S
) · (∏S′) and GL def=∏{ G ·G′ ∣∣ G ∈ S and G′ ∈ S′ }
and we assume that both S and S′ are not empty sets. Note that ∏ /0 = CLb =∏{G /0}. Then, by
product definition, it follows that
E(GL) =
(⋃{
E(G)
∣∣ G ∈ S }∪⋃{ E(G′) ∣∣ G ∈ S′ }∪EL)∗
E(GR) =
(⋃{
E(G)∪E(G′)∪ER(G,G′)
∣∣ G ∈ S and G′ ∈ S′ })∗
where
EL =
{
(l, l′)
∣∣ l ∈⋃{ V (G) ∣∣ G ∈ S } and l′ ∈⋃{ V (G′) ∣∣ G′ ∈ S′ } }
ER(G,G′) = { (l, l′)
∣∣ l ∈V (G) and l′ ∈V (G′) }
Furthermore let ER =
⋃{ ER(G,G′) ∣∣ G ∈ S and G′ ∈ S′ }. For every edge (l, l′) ∈ EL there are a
pair of c-graphs G∈ S and G′ ∈ S′ s.t. l ∈V (G) and l′ ∈V (G′) and then (l, l′)∈ ER(G,G′) and so
(l, l′) ∈ ER. Moreover, for every edge (l, l′) ∈ ER there are a pair of c-graphs G ∈ S and G′ ∈ S′
s.t. (l, l′) ∈ ER(G,G′) with l ∈V (G) and l′ ∈V (G)′. So that (l, l′) ∈ EL. That is EL = ER. Then
E(GR) =
(⋃{
E(G)
∣∣ G ∈ S }∪⋃{ E(G′) ∣∣ G′ ∈ S′ }∪ER)∗
=
(
E(GL)\EL∪ER
)∗
=
(
E(GL)
)∗
= E(GL)
Consequently GL = GR. 
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Proposition 6 (Transitive application distributivity w.r.t. products over causal graphs)
For any causal graphs G, G′ 6= /0 and G′′, it holds that
G ·G′ ·G′′ = G ·G′ ∗G′ ·G′′
Proof . It is clear that G ·G′ ·G′′ ≤ G ·G′ and G ·G′ ·G′′ ≤ G′ ·G′′ and then G ·G′ ·G′′ ≤ G ·
G′ ∗G′ ·G′′. Let G1, G2, GL and GR be respectively G1 = G ·G′, G2 = G′ ·G′′, GL = G1 ·G′′,
and GR = G1 ∗G2. Suppose that GL < GR, i.e. GL ⊃ GR and there is an edge (v1,v2) ∈ GL but
(v1,v2) /∈ GR. Then G1 ⊆ GR and G′′ ⊆ G2 ⊆ GR and one of the following conditions holds:
1. (v1,v2) ∈ G1 ⊆ GR or (v1,v2) ∈ G′′ ⊆ GR which is a contradiction with (v1,v2) /∈ GR.
2. v1 ∈ G1 and v2 ∈ G′′, i.e. v1 ∈ G and v2 ∈ G′′ or v1 ∈ G′ and v2 ∈ G′′. Furthermore, if the
last it is clear that (v1,v2) ∈G′ ·G′′ =G2 ⊆GR which is a contradiction with (v1,v2) /∈GR.
Thus it must be that v1 ∈ G and v2 ∈ G′′. But then, since G′ 6= /0 there is some v′ ∈ G′ and conse-
quently there are edges (v1,v′) ∈G ·G′ =G1 ⊆GR and (v′,v2) ∈G′ ·G′′ =G2 ⊆GR. Since GR is
closed transitively, (v1,v2) ∈GR which is a contradiction with the assumption that (v1,v2) /∈ GR.
That is, GL = G ·G′ ·G′′ = G ·G′ ∗G′ ·G′′ = GR.
Proposition 7 (Application idempotence w.r.t. singleton causal graphs)
For any causal graph G whose only edge is (l, l), G ·G = G.
Proof . By definition G ·G = G∪G∪{ (v1,v2)
∣∣ v1 ∈ G and v2 ∈ G }. Since the only vertex of G
is l, it follows that G ·G = G∪{(l, l)}= G. 
Proposition 8 (Application absorption over causal grapsh)
Let G1, G2 and G3 be three causal graphs. Then G1 ·G2 ·G3 = G2 ∗G1 ·G2 ·G3.
Proof . By definition, it is clear that G1 ·G2 ·G3 ⊇ G2 and then
G2 ∗G1 ·G2 ·G3 = (G2∪G1 ·G2 ·G3)∗ = (G1 ·G2 ·G3)∗ = G1 ·G2 ·G3
Proposition 9 (Absorption Extended)
Let a and b be elements of an algebra holding the identity and absorption equivalences showed
in Figure 2. Then
a∗a ·b = a ·b a∗b ·a = b ·a
Proof . The proof follow from the following equivalences:
a∗a ·b = a∗1 ·a ·b (identity)
= 1 ·a ·b (absorption)
= a ·b (identity)
a∗b ·a = a∗b ·a ·1 (identity)
= b ·a ·1 (absorption)
= b ·a (identity)
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Proposition 10 (Transitivity extended)
Let a, b and c be elements of an algebra holding the identity and absorption equivalences showed
in Figure 2 such that b is different from 1. Then
a ·b∗b · c = a ·b∗b · c∗a · c
follows from application associative, identity and absorption and distributivity over products.
Proof .
a ·b∗b · c∗a · c = (a ·b∗b · c)∗a · c (associative ‘∗’)
= (a ·b · c)∗a · c (transitivity)
= a · (b · c)∗a · c (associative ’·’)
= a · (b · c∗ c) (distributivity)
= a · (b · c) (absorption ext.)
= a ·b · c (associativity)
= a ·b∗b · c (transitivity)
Corollary 1
Given causal graphs G1, G2, G3 and Gl such that (l, l) is the only edge of Gl , the equivalences
reflected in the Figures 8 and 9 hold.
Idempotence
Gl · Gl = Gl
Associativity
G1 · (G2·G3) = (G1·G2) · G3
Product distributivity
G1 · (G2 ∗G3) = (G1 ·G2)∗ (G1 ·G3)
(G1 ∗G2) ·G3 = (G1 ·G3)∗ (G2 ·G3)
Absorption
G2 ∗ G1·G2·G3 = G1·G2·G3
Identity
G1 · G /0 = G1
G /0 · G1 = G1
Transitivity
G1 ·G2 ·G3 = (G1 ·G2)∗ (G2 ·G3) with G2 6= G /0
Fig. 8. Properties of the ‘·’ and ‘∗’ operators over causal graphs (Gl only contains the edge (l, l)).
Absorption (der)
G1 ∗ (G1 ·G2) = G1·G2
G1 ∗ (G2 ·G1) = G2·G1
Transitivity (der)
(G1 ·G2)∗ (G2 ·G3) = (G1 ·G2)∗ (G2 ·G3)∗ (G1 ·G3)
Fig. 9. Properties following from those in Figure 8.
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Theorem 7
Given a set of labels Lb, 〈CLb,∗, ·〉 is the free algebra generated by Lb defined by equations in the
Figure 8, i.e. the mapping graph : Lb −→ CLb mapping each label l to the graph Gl containing
the only edge (l, l) is an injective (preserving-idempotence) homomorphism and for any set F
and idempotence-preserving map δ : Lb−→ F , there exists a homomorphism term : CLb −→ F
defined as term(G) 7→∏{ δ (l1) ·δ (l2)
∣∣ (l1, l2) ∈ G } such that δ = term◦graph.
Proof . For clarity sake we omit the idempotence-preserving mapping δ and we write just l in-
stead of δ (l). Thus the mapping term : CLb −→ F is just term(G) 7→∏{ l1·l2
∣∣ (l1, l2) ∈G }. We
start showing that graph preservers the ‘·’ idempotence equation.
graph(l) ·graph(l) = Gl ·Gl = Gl ∪Gl ∪{ (l1, l2)
∣∣ l1 ∈ Gl and l2 ∈ Gl }
= Gl ∪Gl ∪{(l, l)}= Gl ∪Gl ∪Gl = Gl = graph(l)
Furthermore, suppose graph(l1) = graph(l2), i.e. {(l1, l2)} = {(l2, l2)}. Then l1 = l2. Hence
graph is an injective homomorphism. Now we show that term preserves the ‘∗’. Let D=⋃G∈U G.
Then
∏
G∈U
term(G) = ∏
G∈U
∏
(l1,l2)∈G
l1·l2 = ∏
(l1,l2)∈D
l1·l2
= ∏
(l1,l2)∈D∗
l1·l2 = term(D∗)
= term
(( ⋃
G∈U
G
)∗)
= term
(
∏
G∈U
G
)
We will show now that term also preserves ‘·’.
term(G1) · term(G2) =
(
∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu
u1·u2
)
·
(
∏
(v1,v2)∈Gv
v1·v2
)
= ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
(u1·u2) · (v1·v2)
= ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
u1 · (u2·v1·v2)
= ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
u1 · (u2·v1 ∗ v1·v2)
= ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
u1·u2·v1 ∗u1·v1·v2
= ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
u1·u2 ∗u2·v1 ∗u1·v1 ∗ v1·v2 ∗u1·v1 ∗u1·v2
= ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
(u1·u2 ∗ v1·v2)∗ (u2·v1 ∗u1·v1 ∗u1·v1 ∗u1·v2)
= ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
(u1·u2 ∗ v1·v2)∗ ∏
(u1,u2)∈Gu, (v1,v2)∈Gv
(u2·v1 ∗u1·v1 ∗u1·v1 ∗u1·v2)
= ∏
(l1,l2)∈Gu∪Gv
(l1·l2)∗ ∏
u∈Gu, v∈Gv
(u·v)
= ∏
(l1,l2)∈Gu·Gv
(l1·l2) = term(G1 ·G2)
Finally note that term(graph(l)) = l·l = l (note that l stands for the more formally δ (l)).
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7.2 Alternative causes
We define an explanation formed by a set of causal graphs S as:
∑S = G if G ∈ S and G∗G′ = G′ for all G′ ∈ S
Theorem 8
The set of causal values VLb with the opperations join ‘+’ and meet ‘∗ forms the free, complete
distributive lattice with generated by the set of causal graphs CLb and further ↓: CLb −→ VLb is
an injective homomorphism from the algebra 〈CLb,+,∗, ·〉 to 〈VLb,+,∗, ·〉. . 
Proof of Theorem ??. Let F be the set of filters over the lower semilattice 〈CLb,∗〉. Stumme
was showed in (Stumme 1997) that the concept lattice B〈F,VLb,∆〉 (with F∆I⇔ F ∩ I 6= /0) is
isomorphic to the free completely distributive complete lattice generated by the partial lattice
〈CLb,+,∗〉 where + and ∗ are two partial functions corresponding with the supremum and infi-
mum. In our particular, case for every set of causal graphs S its infimum is defined as ∏S and the
supremum is defined as G ∈ S such that G′ ≤G for all G′ ∈ S, when such G exists and undefined
otherwise. Thus VLb is the set of ideals over the partial lattice 〈CLb,+,∗〉, i.e. every I ∈ VLb is
also closed under defined suprema. He also show that the elements of such lattice are described
as pairs {
(Ft ,It)
∣∣ Ft ⊆ F, It ⊆ VLb, FIt = It and Ft = IIt }
where FIt =
{
I ∈ I ∣∣ ∀F ∈ Ft : F ∩ I 6= /0 }
IIt =
{
F ∈ F ∣∣ ∀I ∈ It : F ∩ I 6= /0 }
That is, every element is in the form 〈IIt ,It〉. Furthermore infima and suprema can be described
as follows: ∧
t∈T
(IIt ,It) =
(⋂
t∈T
IIt ,
( ⋃
t∈T
It
)II)
∨
t∈T
(IIt ,It) =
((⋃
t∈T
IIt
)II
,
⋂
t∈T
It
)
We will show that εI :B−→ VLb given by (IIt ,It) 7→
⋂
It is an isomorphism between 〈B,∨,∧〉
and 〈VLb,∪,∩〉. Note that, since ∏ /0 = G /0 it holds that the empty set is not close under defined
infimum and then it is not a filter, i.e. /0 6∈ F, and then for every filter F ∈ F it holds that G /0 ∈ F .
Thus if It = /0 follows that IIt =F and then IIIt = {I ∈VLb |G /0 ∈ I}=CLb 6= It . That is, 〈 /0I , /0〉 6∈B.
We will show that for every ideal It ∈ I and for every set of ideals It ⊆ I s.t. It =⋂It it holds that
(IIt ,It) ∈B〈F,I,∆〉 ⇐⇒ It =
{
I ∈ I ∣∣ It ⊆ I } (8)
and consequently εI is a bijection between andB and VLb.
Suppose that (IIt ,It) ∈B〈F,I,∆〉. For every I ∈ It it holds that It ⊆ I. So suppose there is I ∈ I
s.t. It ⊆ I and I 6∈ It . Then there is F ∈ IIt s.t. I∩F = /0 and for every element I′ ∈ It it holds that
I′ ∩F 6= /0. Pick a causal graph G s.t. G =∏{G′ | G′ ∈ I′ ∩F and I′ ∈ It}. Since for every G′ it
holds G′ ∈ F and G ≤ G′ follows that G ∈ F (F is close under infimum) and G ∈ I′ (every I′ is
close under ≤). That is, for every I′ ∈ It it holds that G ∈ I′∩F and then, since It = ⋂It , it also
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holds that G ∈ It ∩F and since It ⊆ I also G ∈ I∩F which contradict that I∩F = /0. So that I ∈ It
and it holds that
(IIt ,It) ∈B〈F,I,∆〉=⇒ It =
{
I ∈ I ∣∣ It ⊆ I }
Suppose that It = {I ∈ I | It ⊆ I} but (IIt ,It) ∈B〈F,I,∆〉, i.e. It 6= IIIt . Note that It ⊆ IIIt because
otherwise there are I ∈ It and F ∈ IIt s.t. I∩F = /0 which is a contradiction with the fact that for
every F ∈ IIt and I ∈ It it holds that F ∩ I 6= /0.
So, there is I ∈ IIIt s.t. I 6∈ It , i.e. for every F ∈ IIt it holds that F ∩ I 6= /0 but It 6⊆ I. Pick G ∈ It\I
and F = {G′ | G ≤ G′}. It is clear that F ∈ F and F ∩ It 6= /0 because G ∈ It , so that F ∈ IIt .
Furthermore F ∩ I = /0, because G 6∈ I, which is a contradiction with the assumption. Thus
(IIt ,It) ∈B〈F,I,∆〉 ⇐= It =
{
I ∈ I ∣∣ It ⊆ I }
Now, we will show that (II1,I1)∨ (II2,I2) = (II3,I3) iff I1 ∪ I2 = I3. From the above statement
follows that
I1∩ I2 = {I ∈ I | I1 ⊆ I and I2 ⊆ I}=
= {I ∈ I | I1∪ I2 ⊆ I}
I3 = {I ∈ I | I3 ⊆ I}
That is, I1 ∩ I2 = I3 iff I1 ∪ I2 = I3 and by definition of ∨ the first is equivalent to (II1,I1)∨
(II2,I2) = (I
I
3,I3).
Finally we will show that (II1,I1)∧ (II2,I2) = (II3,I3) iff I1∩ I2 = I3. It holds that
(I1∪ I2)II =
({
I ∈ I ∣∣ I1 ⊆ I or I2 ⊆ I })II =
=
({
I ∈ I ∣∣ I1∩ I2 ⊆ I })II
I3 =
{
I ∈ I ∣∣ I3 ⊆ I }
Since εI is a bijection, it holds that (I1∪ I2)II = I3 iff I1∩ I2 = I3.
Thus εI : B −→ VLb is an isomorphism between 〈B,∨,∧〉 and 〈VLb,∪,∩〉, i.e. 〈VLb,∪,∩〉 is
isomorphic to the free completely distributive lattice generated by 〈CLb,+,∗〉.
Let’s check now that ↓: CLb −→VLb is an injective homomorphism. Stumme has already showed
that εp : CLb −→B given by
εp(G) 7→
({
F ∈ F ∣∣ G ∈ F },{ I ∈ I ∣∣ G ∈ I })
is an injective homomorphism between the partial lattice 〈CLb,+,∗〉 and 〈B,∨,∧〉. So that εI ◦εp
is an injective homomorphism between 〈CLb,+,∗〉 and 〈VLb,∪,∩〉 given by
εI ◦ εp(G) 7→
⋂{
I ∈ VLb
∣∣ G ∈ I } = ↓G
Note that for any causal graph G and G′ ∈ CLb s.t. G′ ≤ G it holds that G′ ∈ εI ◦ εp(G), that
is ↓ G ⊆ εI ◦ εp(G). Furthermore for every causal graph G it holds that ε(G) is an ideal, i.e.
↓ G ∈ VLb and it is clear that G ∈ ↓G so that, εI ◦ εp is an intersection with ↓ G as one of its
operands, thus εI ◦ εp(G) ⊆↓ G. That is ↓ G = εI ◦ εp(G) and consequently it is an injective
homomorphism between 〈CLb,+,∗〉 〈VLb,∪,∩〉.
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Let us show now that the mapping ↓ also preserves the ‘·’ operation. Take any causal graphs G1
and G2, then
↓G1 · ↓G2 = ↓{ (G′1 ·G′2)
∣∣ G′1 ∈ ↓G1 and G′2 ∈ ↓G2 }
= ↓{ (G′1 ·G′2)
∣∣ G′1 ≤ G1 and G′2 ≤ G2 } = ↓(G1 ·G2)
Note that, from Proposition 1, it follows that G′1 ·G′2 ≤ G1 ·G2. That is, ↓ in an homomorphism
between 〈CLb,+,∗·〉 and 〈VLb,+,∗·〉.
Corollary 2
Every equivalence showed in Figure 4 hold. Futheremore equivalences showed in Figures 8 and 9
also hold if principal ideals ↓G1, ↓G2 and ↓G3 are considered instead of causal graphs G1, G2
and G3.
Corollary 3
Given causal terms without sums c, d, e and a label l, the equivalences reflected in the Fig-
ures 10 and 11 hold.
Idempotence
l · l = l
Associativity
c · (d·e) = (c·d) · e
Product distributivity
c · (d ∗ e) = (c ·d)∗ (c · e)
(c∗d) · e = (c · e)∗ (d · e)
Identity
c · 1 = c
1 · c = c
Absorption
d ∗ c·d·e = c·d·e
Transitivity
c ·d · e = (c ·d)∗ (d · e) with d 6= 1
Fig. 10. Properties of the ‘·’ and ‘∗’ operators over causal terms without ‘+’.
Absorption (der)
d ∗ c·d = c·d
d ∗ d·e = d·e
Transitivity (der)
c ·d ∗d · e = c ·d ∗d · e∗ c · e
Fig. 11. Additionally properties of the ‘·’ and ‘∗’ operators over causal terms without ‘+’.
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Proposition 11 (Application associativity)
Let T , U and W be three causal values. Then T · (U ·W ) = (T ·U) ·W .
Proof . By definition, it follows that
(T ·U) ·W = ↓{ Gt ·Gu
∣∣ Gt ∈ T and Gu ∈U } ·W
= ↓{ G′ ·Gw
∣∣ G′ ≤ Gt ·Gu, Gt ∈ T, Gu ∈U and Gw ∈W }
It is clear that Gt ·Gu ≤ Gt ·Gu and then
↓{ (Gt ·Gu) ·Gw
∣∣ Gt ∈ T, Gu ∈U and Gw ∈W } ⊆ ↓{ G′ ·Gw ∣∣ G′ ≤ Gt ·Gu, Gt ∈ T, . . . }
Furthermore since ‘·’ is monotonic, for every G′ ≤ Gt ·Gu, it holds that G′ ·Gw ≤ (Gt ·Gu) ·Gw
and then
(T ·U) ·W = ↓{ (Gt ·Gu) ·Gw
∣∣ Gt ∈ T, Gu ∈U and Gw ∈W }
Applying the same reasoning we can also conclude that
T · (U ·W ) = ↓{ Gt · (Gu ·Gw)
∣∣ Gt ∈ T, Gu ∈U and Gw ∈W }
That is, T · (U ·W ) = (T ·U) ·W holds whether, for every causal graph Gt , Gu and Gw, it holds
that (Gt ·Gu) ·Gw = Gt · (Gu ·Gw). This holds due to Proposition 2.
Proposition 12 (Application distributivity w.r.t. additions)
Let T , U and W be three causal values. Then, it holds that U · (T +W ) = (U ·T )+(U ·W ) and
(U +T ) ·W = (U ·W )+(T ·W ).
Proof . By definition, it follows that
(U ·T )+(U ·W ) = (U ·T )∪ (U ·W )
= ↓{ GU ·GT ∣∣ GU ∈U and GT ∈ T } ∪ ↓{ GU ·GT ∣∣ GU ∈U and GW ∈W }
= ↓{ GU ·G′ ∣∣ GU ∈U and G′ ∈ T ∪W }=U · (T ∪W ) =U · (T +W )
Furthermore (U +T ) ·W = (U ·W )+(T ·W ) holds symmetrically.
Proposition 13 (Application absorption)
Let T , U and W be three causal values. Then T = T + U ·T ·W and U ·T ·W = T ∗U ·T ·W
Proof . From Proposition 11 it follows that
U ·T ·W = ↓{ GU ·GT ·GW ∣∣ GU ∈U, GT ∈ T and GW ∈W }
Furthermore, for every c-graph GT ∈ T , it holds that GU ·GT · TW ≤ GT . Then, since T is an
ideal, it follows that GU ·GT ·TW ∈ T and consequently U ·T ·W ⊆ T . Thus U ·T ·W ∪T = T and
U ·T ·W ∩T =U ·T ·W and, by definition, these equalities can be rewritten as U ·T ·W +T = T
and U ·T ·W ∗T =U ·T ·W .
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Proposition 14 (Application identity and annihilator)
Given a causal value T , it holds that T = 1 ·T , T = T ·1, 0 = T ·0 and 0 = 0 ·T .
Proof . Note that 1 and 0 respectively correspond to CLb and /0 and by definition it follows that
1 ·T = ↓{ G ·GT ∣∣ G ∈ CLb and GT ∈ T }= T
0 ·T = ↓{ G ·GT ∣∣ G ∈ /0 and GT ∈ T }= /0 = 0
The other cases are symmetric.
Corollary 4
The equivalences reflected in the Figure 2 hold.
Theorem 9
Given a set of labels Lb, 〈VLb,+,∗, ·〉 is the free algebra generated by Lb defined by equations in
the Figure 4 and 2, i.e. the mapping value : Lb−→ VLb mapping each label l to the causal value
↓Gl with Gl being the causal graph containing the only edge (l, l) is an injective (preserving-
idempotence) homomorphism and for any set F and idempotence-preserving map δ : Lb−→ F ,
there exists a homomorphism term : VLb −→ F defined as term(U) 7→ ∑{ term(G)
∣∣ G ∈U }
such that δ = term◦graph.
Proof . Note, from Theorems 7 and 8, that graph : Lb −→ CLb and ↓: CLb −→ VLb are injective
homomorphisms respectively from Lb to CLb and from CLb to VLb. Furthermore the composi-
tion of injective homomorphisms is injective too. So that value(l) 7→ ↓graph(l) is an injective
homomorphism between Lb and VLb. We will show now that term : VLb −→ F preserves the ‘+’:
term
(
∑
U∈U
U
)
= term
(⋃
U
)
= ∑
G∈⋃U term(G) = ∑U∈U ∑G∈U term(G) = ∑U∈U term(U)
that term also preserves ‘∗’:
∏
U∈U
term(U) = ∏
U∈U
∑
G∈U
term(G) = ∑
ϕ∈Φ
∏
U∈U
term(ϕ(U)) = ∑
ϕ∈Φ
term
(
∏
U∈U
ϕ(U)
)
= ∑
t∈T1
t
term
(
∏
U∈U
U
)
= term
(⋂
U
)
= ∑
G∈⋂U term(G) = ∑t∈T2 t
whereΦ def= { ϕ ∣∣ ϕ(U)∈U with U ∈U }. Note that G∈⋂U implies that G∈U for all U ∈U
and consequently there is ϕ ∈ Φ s.t. ϕ(U) = G for all U ∈ U . Thus term(∏U∈U ϕ(U)) =
term
(
∏U∈U G
)
= term(G). That is T2 ⊆ T1. Note also that ∏U∈U ϕ(U) =
(⋃
U∈U U
)∗ ⊇ ϕ(U)
for all U ∈ U and consequently ∏U∈U U ∈U for all U ∈ U and so that ∏U∈U U ∈
⋂
U and
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T2 ⊇ T1. And that term preserves ‘·’ too:
term(U) · term(W ) =
(
∑
Gu∈U
term(Gu)
)
·
(
∑
Gw∈W
term(Gw)
)
= ∑
Gu∈U, Gw∈W
term(Gu) · term(Gw)
= ∑
Gu∈U, Gw∈W
term(Gu ·Gw)
= term
(
∑
Gu∈U, Gw∈W
Gu ·Gw
)
= term
(
∑
Gu∈U
Gu · ∑
Gw∈W
Gw
)
= term(U ·W )
Finally term(value(l)) = ∑G∈value(l) term(G) = term(Gl) and, from Theorem 7, term(Gl) = l.
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7.3 Positive programs
Lemma 7.1
Let P be a positive (and possible infinite) logic program over signature 〈At,Lb〉. Then, (i) the
least fix point of TP, lfp(TP) is the least model of P, and (ii) lfp(TP) = TP ↑ ω (0). 
Proof . Since the set of causal values forms a lattice causal logic programs can be translated to
Generalized Annotated Logic Programming (GAP). GAP is a general a framework for multival-
ued logic programming where the set of truth values must to form an upper semilattice and rules
(annotated clauses) have the following form:
H : ρ ← B1 : µ1 & . . . & Bn : µn (9)
where L0, . . . ,Lm are literals, ρ is an annotation (may be just a truth value, an annotation variable
or a complex annotation) and µ1, . . . ,µn are values or annotation variables. A complex annotation
is the result to apply a total continuous function to a tuple of annotations. Thus a positive program
P is encoded in a GAP program, GAP(P) rewriting each rule R ∈Π of the form
t : H← B1∧ . . .∧Bn (10)
as a rule GAP(R) in the form (9) where µ1, . . . ,µn are annotation that capture the causal values
of each body literal and ρ is a complex annotation defined as ρ = (µ1 ∗ . . .∗µn) · t.
Thus we will show that a causal interpretation I |=Π if and only if I |=r GAP(P) where |=r refers
to the GAP restricted semantics.
For any program P and interpretation I, by definition, I |= P (resp. I |=r GAP(P)) iff I |= R (resp.
I |=r GAP(R)) for every rule R ∈ P. Thus it is enough to show that for every rule R it holds that
I |= R iff I |=r GAP(R).
By definition, for any rule R of the form of (10) and an interpretation I, I |= R if and only if(
I(B1)∗ . . .∗ I(Bn)
) · t ≤ I(H) whereas for any rule GAP(R) in the form of (9), I |=r GAP(R) iff
for all µi ≤ I(Bi) implies that ρ = (µ1 ∗ . . .∗µn) · t ≤ I(H).
For the only if direction, take µi = I(Bi), then ρ = (µ1 ∗ . . .∗µn) · t = (I(B1)∗ . . .∗ I(Bn)) · t and
then ρ ≤ I(H) implies (I(B1)∗ . . .∗ I(Bn)) · t ≤ I(H), i.e. I |=r GAP(R) implies I |= R. For the if
direction, take µi ≤ I(Bi) then, since product an applications are monotonic operations, it follows
that (µ1 ∗ . . .∗µn) · t ≤ (I(B1)∗ . . .∗ I(Bn)) · t ≤ I(H), That is, I |= R also implies I |=r GAP(R).
Consequently I |= R iff I |=r GAP(R).
Thus, from Theorem 1 in (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992), it follows that the operator TP is
monotonic.
To show that the operator TP is also continuous we need to show that for every causal program
P the translation GAP(P) is an acceptable program. Indeed since in a program GAP(P) all body
atoms are v-annotated it is acceptable. Thus from Theorem 3 in (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992),
it follows that TP ↑ ω (0) = l f p(TP) and this is the least model of P.
Lemma 7.2
Given a positive and completely labelled program P, for every atom p and integer k ≥ 1,
TP ↑ k (0)(p) = ∑
R∈Ψ
∑
f∈R
∏
{
f
(
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q)
) ∣∣ q ∈ body(R) } · label(R)
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where Ψ is the set of rules Ψ = { R ∈ Π ∣∣ head(R) = p } and R is the set of choice functions
R =
{
f
∣∣ f (S) ∈ S }.
Proof . By definition of TP ↑ k (0)(p) it follows that
TP ↑ k (0)(p) =∑
{ (
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q1)∗ . . .∗TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q1)
) · label(R) ∣∣ R ∈ P with head(R) = p }
then, applying distributive of application w.r.t. to the sum and and rewriting the sum and the
product aggregating properly, it follows that
TP ↑ k (0)(p) = ∑
R∈Ψ
∏
{
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q)
∣∣ q ∈ body(R) } · label(R)
Furthermore for any atom q the causal value TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q) can be expressed as the sum of all
c-graphs in it and then
TP ↑ k (0)(p) = ∑
R∈Ψ
∏
{
∑
f∈R
f
(
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q)
) ∣∣ q ∈ body(R) } ·abel(R)
and applying distributivity of products over sums it follows that
TP ↑ k (0)(p) = ∑
R∈Ψ
∑
f∈R
∏
{
f
(
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q)
) ∣∣ q ∈ body(R) } · lR 
Lemma 7.3
Given a positive and completely labelled program P and a causal graph G, for every atom p and
integer k≥ 1, it holds that G∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p) iff there is a rule l : p← q1, . . . ,qm and causal graphs
Gq1 , . . . , Gqm respectively in TP ↑ k−1 (0)(qi) and G≤
(
Gq1 ∗ . . .∗Gqm
) · l.
Proof . From Lemma 7.2 it follows that G ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p) iff
G ∈ value
(
∑
R∈Ψ
∑
f∈R
∏
{
f
(
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q)
) ∣∣ q ∈ body(R) } · label(R) )
iff G ∈
⋃
R∈Ψ
⋃
f∈R
value
(
∏
{ ↓ f (TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q))) ∣∣ q ∈ body(R) } · label(R)
iff there is R ∈Φ, with head(R) = p and a choice function f ∈Ψ s.t.
G ∈ value
(
∏
{
f
(
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q)
) ∣∣ q ∈ body(R) } · label(R))
Let R = l : p← q1, . . . ,qm and f
(
TP ↑ k−1 (0)(qi)
)
= Gqi . Then the above can be rewritten as
G≤ (Gq1 ∗ . . .∗Gqm) · l. 
Definition 10
Given a causal graph G = 〈V,E〉, we define the restriction of G to a set of vertex V ′ ⊆ V as
the casual graph G′ = 〈V ′,E ′〉 where E ′ = { (l1, l2) ∈ E
∣∣ l1 ∈ V ′ and l2 ∈ V ′ }, and we define
the reachable restriction of G to a set of vertex V ′ ⊆ V , in symbols GV ′ , as the restriction of
G to the set of vertex V ′′ from where some vertex l ∈ V ′ is reachable V ′′ = { l′ ∈ V ∣∣ (l′, l) ∈
E∗ for some l ∈V ′ }. When V ′ = l is a singleton we write Gl .
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Lemma 7.4
Let P be a positive, completely labelled program, p and q be atoms, G be a causal graph, R be a
causal rule s.t. head(R) = q and label(R) = l is a vertex in G and k ∈ {1, . . . ,ω} be an ordinal.
If G ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p), then Gl ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(q). 
Proof . In case that k = 0 the lemma statement holds vacuous. Otherwise assume as induction hy-
pothesis that the lemma statement holds for k−1. From Lemma 7.3, since G∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p), there
is a rule Rp = (lp : p← p1, . . . , pm) and c-graph Gp1 , . . . ,Gpm s.t. each Gpi ∈ TP ↑ k−1 (0)(pi) and
G≤ (Gp1 ∗ . . .∗Gpm) · lp.
If l = lp then, since P is uniquely labelled, R= Rp, Gl =G and by assumption G ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p).
Otherwise l ∈ Gpi for some Gpi and in its turn Gpi ∈ TP ↑ k−1 (0)(pi). By induction hypothesis
Gl ∈ TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q) and since TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q)⊆ TP ↑ k (0)(q) it follows that Gl ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(q).
In case that k = ω , by definition TP ↑ ω (0)(p) = ∑i<ω TP ↑ i (0)(p) and the same for atom q.
Thus, if G ∈ TP ↑ ω (0)(p) there is some i < ω s.t. G ∈ TP ↑ i (0)(p), and as we already show,
Gl ∈ TP ↑ i (0)(q) and consequently Gl ∈ TP ↑ ω (0)(q). 
Lemma 7.5
Let P be a positive, completely labelled program, p be an atom and G be a causal graph and k≥ 1
be an integer. If G is maximal in TP ↑ k (0)(p) then
1. there is a causal rule R = (l : p← p1, . . . , pm) and there are causal graphs Gp1 , . . . ,Gpm s.t.
each Gpi ∈maxTP ↑ k−1 (0)(pi) and Gp = (Gp1 ∗ . . .∗Gpm) · l and
2. l is not a vertex of any Gpi . 
Proof . From Lemma 7.3 it follows that G∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p) iff there is a rule R=(l : p← q1, . . . ,qm)
and causal graphs G′q1 , . . . ,G
′
qm s.t. each Gpi ∈maxTP ↑ k−1 (0)(pi) and G =
(
G′q1 ∗ . . .∗G′qm
) · l.
Let Gq1 , . . . ,Gqm be causes such that each Gqi ∈ maxTP ↑ k−1 (0)(qi) and G′qi ≤ Gqi and let G′
be the c-graph G′ =
(
Gq1 ∗ . . . ∗Gqm
) · l. By product and application monotonicity it holds that
G≤G′ and, again from Lemma 7.3, it follows that G′ ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p). Thus, since G is maximal,
it must to be that G = G′ and consequently G =
(
Gq1 ∗ . . .∗Gqm
) · l where each Gqi is maximal.
Suppose that l is a vertex of Gpi for some Gpi . From Lemma 7.4, if follows that G
l
pi ∈TP ↑ k (0)(p).
Furthermore, since Gpi ⊇ Glpi , it follows that Gpi ≤ Glpi and, since l is a label (l 6= 1), it follows
that G<Gpi and so that G<G
l
pi which contradicts the assumption that G ∈maxTP ↑ k (0)(p).
Definition 11
Given a causal graph G we define height(G) as the length of the maximal simple (no repeated
vertices) path in G.
Lemma 7.6
Let P be a positive, completely labelled program, p be an atom, k ∈ {1, . . . ,ω} be an ordinal and
G be a causal graph. If G ∈maxTP ↑ k (0)(p) and height(G) = h≤ k then G ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p).
Proof . In case that h = 0, from Lemma 7.5, it follows that if G ∈ maxTP ↑ k (0)(p) there is
a causal rule R = (l : p← p1, . . . , pm) and c-graphs. . . . Furthermore, since P is completely la-
belled, it follows that l 6= 1 and then G < l < 1. Since 1 is the only c-graph whose height is 0 the
lemma statement holds vacuous.
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In case that h > 0, we proceed by induction assuming as hypothesis that the lemma statement
holds for any h′ < h. From Lemma 7.5, there is a causal rule l : p← p1, . . . , pm, and there are
causal graphs Gp1 , . . . ,Gpm s.t. each Gpi ∈ maxTP ↑ k−1 (0)(pi), G = GR · l and l 6∈ V (Gpi) for
any Gpi where GR = Gp1 ∗ . . .∗Gpm .
If m = 0 then G = 1 · l = l, height(l) = 1 and l ∈ maxTP ↑ k (0)(p) for any k ≥ 1. Otherwise,
since any path in Gpi is also a path Gp, it is clear that height(Gpi) = h
′
pi ≤ h for any Gpi . Suppose
that h′pi = h for some Gpi . Then there is a simple path l1, . . . , lh of length h in Gpi and, since
G = GR · l, there is an edge (lh, l) ∈ E(G). That is l1, . . . , lh, l is a walk of length h+1 in G and,
since l 6∈V (Gpi), it follows that li 6= l with 1≤ i≤ h. So that l1, . . . , lh, l is a simple path of length
h+1 which contradicts the assumption that height(G) = h. Thus height(Gpi) = h
′
pi < h for any
Gpi and then, by induction hypothesis, Gpi ∈maxTP ↑ h
′
pi (0)(pi).
Let h′ =max{ h′pi
∣∣ 1≤ i≤m }< h. Since the TP operator is monotonic and h′pi ≤ h′ for any pi, it
follows that TP ↑ h
′
pi (0)(pi)≤ TP ↑ h′ (0)(pi) and then there are casual graphs G′p1 , . . . ,G′pm such
that each G′pi ∈ maxTP ↑ h
′
(0)(pi), Gpi ≤ G′pi and G′ = GR · l where G′R = G′p1 ∗ . . .∗G′pm . By
product and application monotonicity, it follows that G ≤ G′, and, from Lemma 7.3, it follows
that G′ ∈ TP ↑ h′+1 (0)(p). Since h′+1≤ h it follows that G′ ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p) and since G≤ G′ it
follows that G ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p).
Suppose that G 6∈ maxTP ↑ h (0)(p). Then there is G′′ ∈ maxTP ↑ h (0)(p) s.t. G < G′′ and then,
since h ≤ k, it follows that G′′ ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p) which, since G < G′′, contradicts the assumption
that G ∈maxTP ↑ k (0)(p). Thus, if G ∈maxTP ↑ k (0)(p) and height(G) = h≤ k it follows that
G ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p).
In case that k=ω , by definition TP ↑ ω (0)(p)=∑i<ω TP ↑ i (0)(p). Thus, if G∈maxTP ↑ ω (0)(p)
and height(G) = h then there is some i<ω s.t. G∈maxTP ↑ i (0)(p) and h≤ i, and as we already
show, then G ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p). 
Lemma 7.7
Let P,Q two positive causal logic programs such that Q is the result of replacing label l in P by
some u (a label or 1) then TQ ↑ k (0)(p) = TP ↑ k (0)(p)[l 7→ u] for any atom p and k ∈ {1, . . . ,ω}.
Proof . In case that n = 0, TQ ↑ k (0)(p) = 0 and TP ↑ k (0)(p) = 0 and 0 = 0[l 7→ u]. That is
TQ ↑ k (0)(p) = TP ↑ k (0)(p)[l 7→ u].
We proceed by induction on k assuming that TQ ↑ k−1 (0)(p) = TP ↑ k−1 (0)(p)[l 7→ u] for any
atom p and we will show that TQ ↑ (0)(p) = TP ↑ k (0)(p)[l 7→ u].
Pick G ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p) then, from Lemma 7.3, there is a rule l′ : p ← q1, . . . ,qm and causal
graphs Gq1 , . . . , Gqm each one respectively in TP ↑ k−1 (0)(qi) s.t. G≤ GR = (Gq1 ∗ . . .∗Gqm) · l′.
Thus, by induction hypothesis, for every atom qi and c-graph Gqi ∈ TP ↑ k−1 (0)(q) it holds that
Gqi [l 7→ u] ∈ TQ ↑ k−1 (0)(qi).
Let GR[l 7→ u] be a c-graph defined as GR[l 7→ u] =
(
Gq1 [l 7→ u] ∗ . . . ∗Gqm [l 7→ u]
) · l′[l 7→ u].
Then, since G ≤ GR, it follows that G[l 7→ u] ≤ GR[l 7→ u] and then, again from Lemma 7.3, it
follows that G[l 7→ u] ∈ TQ ↑ n (0)(p). That is TP ↑ k (0)(p)[l 7→ u]⊆ TQ ↑ k (0)(p).
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Pick G ∈ TQ ↑ k (0)(p) then, from Lemma 7.3, there is a rule there is a rule l′ : p← q1, . . . ,qm
and c-graphs Gq1 , . . . , Gqm respectively in TP ↑ k−1 (0)(qi) s.t. G ≤ GR where GR = (Gq1 ∗ . . . ∗
Gqm) · l′.
By induction hypothesis, for every atom qi and graph Gqi it holds that if Gqi ∈ TQ ↑ k−1 (0)(qi)
then Gqi ∈ TP ↑ k−1 (0)(qi)[l 7→ u]. Thus, it follows that there is a graph G′qi ∈ TP ↑ k−1 (0)(qi)
such that G′qi [l 7→ u] = Gqi . Let G′R be a graph s.t. G′R =
(
G′q1 ∗ . . .∗G′qm
) · l′. From Lemma 7.3 for
every causal graph G′ ≤G′R it holds that G′ ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p). Since G′R[l 7→ u] =GR and G≤GR it
follows that G≤GR[l 7→ u] and, since GR ∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p), it follows that G∈ TP ↑ k (0)(p)[l 7→ u].
Consequently TP ↑ k (0)(p)[l 7→ u]⊇ TQ ↑ n (0)(p) and then TP ↑ k (0)(p)[l 7→ u] = TQ ↑ n (0)(p).
In case that k = ω , by definition TP ↑ ω (0)(p)[l 7→ u] = ∑i<ω TP ↑ (0)(i)p[l 7→ u] and as we
alerady show TP ↑ (0)(i)p[l 7→ u] = TQ ↑ i (0)(p) for all integer i < ω , so that, their sum is also
equal and consequently TP ↑ ω (0)(p)[l 7→ u] = TQ ↑ ω (0)(p).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let P′ be a positive, completely labelled causal program with the same rules
as P. From Lemma 7.1 it follows that (i) lfp(TP) and lfp(TP′) are respectively the least model of
the programs P and P′, and (ii) lfp(TP) = TP ↑ ω (0) and lfp(TP′) = TP′ ↑ ω (0).
Futhermore, it is clear that if P is an infinite program, i.e. n = ω , then TP′ ↑ n (0) = TP′ ↑ ω (0).
Otherwise, by definition it holds that TP′ ↑ n (0) ≤ TP′ ↑ ω (0). Suppose TP′ ↑ n (0)< TP′ ↑ ω (0).
Then there is some atom p and c-graph G ∈ TP′ ↑ ω (0)(p) such that G 6∈ TP′ ↑ n (0)(p). The
longest simple path in G must be smaller than the number of its vertices and this must be smaller
than the number of labels of the program which in its turn is equal to the number of rules n, i.e.
height(G) = h≤ n. From Lemma 7.6 it follows that G ∈ TP′ ↑ h (0)(p) and since h≤ n it follows
that TP′ ↑ h (0)(p)⊆ TP′ ↑ n (0)(p) and so that G ∈ TP′ ↑ n (0)(p) which is a contradiction with
the assumption that G ∈ TP ↑ ω (0)(p) but G 6∈ TP ↑ n (0)(p). Thus TP′ ↑ n (0) = TP′ ↑ ω (0).
Furthermore, from Lemma 7.7, TP ↑ k (0)(p) = TP′ ↑ k (0)(p)[l′1 7→ l1] . . . [l′n 7→ ln] for k ∈ {n,ω}
and where l′1, . . . , l
′
n are the labels of rules of P
′ and l1, . . . , ln are the correspondent labels of such
rules in P. Thus, since TP′ ↑ n (0) = TP′ ↑ ω (0), it follows that TP ↑ n (0) = TP ↑ ω (0).
Lemma 7.8
For any proof pi(p) it holds that
graph
(pi(q1), . . . ,pi(qm)
p
(l)
)
=
(
graph(pi(q1))∗ . . .∗graph(pi(q1))
) · l
Proof . We proceed by structural induction assuming that for every proof in the antecedent pi(qi)
and every label l′ ∈V (graph(pi(qi))) there is an edge (l′, label(pi(qi))) ∈ E(graph(pi(qi))).
By definition graph(pi(p)) = G∗pi(p) is the reflexive and transitive closure of Gpi(p) and then
graph(pi(p)) =
(⋃{
graph(pi(qi))
∣∣ 1≤ i≤ m }∪{ (label(pi(qi), l) ∣∣ 1≤ i≤ m })∗
Thus, graph(pi(p))≥∏
{
graph(pi(qi))
∣∣ 1≤ i≤m } · l and remain to show that for every atom
qi and label l′ ∈ V (graph(pi(qi))) the edge (l′, l) ∈ E(graph(pi(p))). Indeed, since by induc-
tion hypothesis there is an edge (l′, label(pi(qi))) ∈ E(graph(pi(qi)))⊆ E(graph(pi(p)), the fact
that the edge (label(pi(qi), l) ∈ E(graph(pi(p))) and since graph(pi(p)) is closed transitively, it
follows that (l′, l) ∈ E(graph(pi(p))). 
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Lemma 7.9
Let P be a positive, completely labelled program and pi(p) be a proof for p w.r.t. P. Then it holds
that graph(pip) ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p) where h is the height of pi(p) which is recursively defined as
height(pi) = 1+max{ height(pi ′) ∣∣ pi ′ is a sub-proof of pi }
Proof . In case that h = 1 the antecedent of pi(p) is empty, i.e.
pi(p) =
>
p
(l)
where l is the label of the fact (l : p). Then graph(pi(p)) = l. Furthermore, since the fact (l : p)
is in the program P, it follows that l ∈ TP ↑ 1 (0)(p).
In the remain cases, we proceed by structural induction assuming that for every natural num-
ber h ≤ n− 1, atom p and proof pi(p) of p w.r.t. P whose height(pi(p)) = h it holds that
graph(pi(p)) ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p) and we will show it in case that h = n.
Since height(pip)> 1 it has a non empty antecedent, i.e.
pi(p) =
pi(q1), . . . ,pi(qm)
p
(l)
where l is the label of the rule l : p ← q1, . . . ,qm. By height definition, for each qi it holds
that height(pi(qi))≤ n−1 and so that, by induction hypothesis, graph(pi(qi)) ∈ TP ↑ h−1 (0)(qi).
Thus, from Lemmas 7.3 and 7.8, it follows respectively that
∏{ graph(pi(qi))
∣∣ 1≤ i≤ m } · l ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p)
graph(pi(p)) =∏{ graph(pi(qi))
∣∣ 1≤ i≤ m } · l
That is, graph(pi(p)) ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p). 
Lemma 7.10
Let P be a positive, completely labelled program and pi(p) be a proof of p w.r.t. P. For every
atom p and maximal causal graph G ∈ TP ↑ ω (0)(p) there is a non-redundant proof pi(p) for p
w.r.t. P s.t. graph(pi(p)) = G.
Proof . From Lemma 7.5 for any maximal graph G∈TP ↑ k (0)(p), there is a rule l : p← q1, . . . ,qm
and maximal graphs Gq1 ∈ TP ↑ h−1 (0)(q1), . . . ,Gqm ∈ TP ↑ k−1 (0)(qm) s.t.
G = (Gq1 ∗ . . .∗Gqm) · l
Furthermore, we assume as induction hypothesis that for every atom qi there is a non redundant
proof pi(qi) for qi w.r.t. P s.t. graph(pi(qi)) = Gqi . Then pi(p) defined as
pi(p) =
pi(q1), . . . ,pi(qm)
p
(l)
is a proof for p w.r.t. P which holds graph(pi(p)) = Gp (from Lemma 7.8) and height(pi(p) ≤
h. Furthermore, suppose that pi(p) is redundant, i.e. there is a proog pi ′ for p w.r.t P such
that graph(pi(p)) < graph(pi ′). Let h = height(pi ′). Then, from Lemma 7.9, it follows that
graph(pi ′) ∈ TP ↑ h (0)(p) and then graph(pi ′) ∈ TP ↑ ω (0)(p) which contradicts the hypothe-
sis that G is maximal in TP ↑ ω (0)(p). 
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Proof of Theorem 3. From Theorem 2 it follows that the least model I is equal to TP ↑ ω (0). For
the only if direction, from Lemma 7.10, it follows that for every maximal c-graph G ∈ I(p) =
TP ↑ ω (0)(p) there is a non-redundant proof pi(p) for p w.r.t P s.t. G = graph(pi(p)). That is,
pi(p) ∈ Πp and then G = graph(pi(p)) ∈ graph(Πp). For the if direction, from Lemma 7.9, for
every G ∈ graph(Πp), i.e. G = graph(pi(p)) for some non-redundant proof pi(p) for p w.r.t.
P, it holds that G ∈ TP ↑ ω (0)(p) and so that G ∈ I(p). Furthermore, suppose that G is not
maximal, i.e. there is a maximal c-graph G′ ∈ I(p) s.t. G < G′ and a proof pi ′ for p w.r.t. P s.t.
graph(pi ′) = G′ which contradicts that pi(p) is non-redundant. 
Lemma 7.11
Let t be a causal term. Then value(t[l 7→ u]) = value(t)[l 7→ u].
Proof . We proceed by structural induction. In case that t is a label. If t = l then value(l[l 7→
u] = value(u) =↓ u = value(l)[l 7→ u]. If t = l′ 6= l then value(l′[l 7→ u] = value(l′) =↓ l′ =
value(l′)[l 7→ u]. In case that t = ∏T it follows that value(∏T [l 7→ u]) = ⋂{ value(t ′[l 7→
u])
∣∣ t ′ ∈T }) and by induction hypothesis value(t ′[l 7→ u])= value(t ′)[l 7→ u]. Then value(∏T [l 7→
u]) =
⋂{ value(t ′)[l 7→ u] ∣∣ t ′ ∈ T }) = value(∏T )[l 7→ u]. The cases for t = ∑T is analo-
gous. In case that t = t1 · t2 it follows that value(t[l 7→ u]) = value(t1[l 7→ u]) ·value(t2[l 7→ u]) =
value(t1)[l 7→ u] · value(t2)[l 7→ u] = value(t)[l 7→ u]
Proof of Theorem 4. From Theorem 2, models I and I′ are respectively equal to TP ↑ ω (0) and
TP′ ↑ ω (0). Furthermore, from Lemma 7.7, it follows that TP′ ↑ ω (0)(p) = TP ↑ ω (0)(p)[l 7→ u]
for any atom p. Lemma 7.11 shows that the replacing can be done in any causal term without
operate it.
Proof of Theorem 5. It is clear that if every rule in P is unlabelled, i.e. P = P′, then their least
model assigns 0 to every f alse atom and 1 to every true atom, so that their least models coincide
with the classical one, i.e. I = I′ and then Icl = I = I′. Otherwise, let Pn be a program where n
rules are labelled. We can build a program Pn−1 removing one label l and, from Theorem 4, it
follows that In−1 = In[l→ 1]. By induction hypothesis the corresponding classical interpretation
of least model of Pn−1 coincides with the least model of the unlabelled program, i.e. Icln−1 = I
′,
and then In[l 7→ 1]cl = Icln−1 = I′. Furthermore, for every atom p and c-graph G it holds that
G ∈ In(p) iff G[l 7→ 1] ∈ In[l 7→ 1](p). Simple remain to note that value(z) = /0, so that In(p) = 0
iff In[l 7→ 1](p) = 0 and consequently Icln = In[l 7→ 1]cl = I′. 
Proof of Theorem 6. By definition I and Icl assigns 0 to the same atoms, so that PI = PI
cl
.
Furthermore let Q (instead of P′ for clarity) be the unlabelled version of P. Then QIcl is the
unlabelled version of PI . (1) Let I be a stable model of P and J be the least model of QI
cl
. Then,
I is the least model of PI and, from Theorem 5, it follows that Icl = J, i.e. Icl is a stable model
of Q. (2) Let I′ is a stable model of Q and I be the least model of PI′ . Since I′ is a stable model
of Q, by definition it is the least model of QI
′
, furthermore, since QI
′
is the unlabelled version of
PI
′
it follows, from Theorem 5, that Icl = I′. Note that PI = PIcl = PI′ . Thus I is a stable model
of P. 
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8 Algebraic completeness
We will show that causal terms with the algebraic properties reflected in Figures 12 and 13 are
correct and complete with respect to the algebra of causal values.
Associativity
t + (u+w) = (t+u) + w
t ∗ (u∗w) = (t ∗u) ∗ w
Commutativity
t + u = u + t
t ∗ u = u ∗ t
Absorption
t = t + (t ∗u)
t = t ∗ (t+u)
Distributive
t + (u∗w) = (t+u) ∗ (t+w)
t ∗ (u+w) = (t ∗u) + (t ∗w)
Identity
t = t + 0
t = t ∗ 1
Idempotence
t = t + t
t = t ∗ t
Annihilator
1 = 1 + t
0 = 0 ∗ t
Fig. 12. Sum and product satisfy the properties of a completely distributive lattice.
Absorption
t = t + u · t · w
u · t · w = t ∗ u · t · w
Associativity
t · (u·w) = (t·u) · w
Identity
t = 1 · t
t = t · 1
Annihilator
0 = t · 0
0 = 0 · t
Indempotence
l · l = l
Addition distributivity
t · (u+w) = (t·u) + (t·w)
(t + u) · w = (t·w) + (u·w)
Product distributivity
c ·d · e = (c ·d)∗ (d · e) with d 6= 1
c · (d ∗ e) = (c ·d)∗ (c · e)
(c∗d) · e = (c · e)∗ (d · e)
Fig. 13. Properties of the ‘·’ operator (c,d,e are terms without ‘+’ and l is a label).
First note that the algebraic properties for “∗” and “+” reflected Figure 12 are the common
algebraic properties satisfy by distributive lattices. Then their correctness follows directly from
Theorem 1.
Proposition 15 (Application homomorphism)
The mapping ↓: CLb,−→ VLb is an homomorphism between 〈CLb, ·〉 and 〈VLb, ·〉,
Proof . Take any c-graphs G1 and G2, then
↓G1 · ↓G2 = ↓{ (G′1 ·G′2)
∣∣ G′1 ∈ ↓G1 and G′2 ∈ ↓G2 }
= ↓{ (G′1 ·G′2)
∣∣ G′1 ≤ G1 and G′2 ≤ G2 } = ↓(G1 ·G2)
Note that, from Proposition 1,it follows that G′1 ·G′2 ≤ G1 ·G2. That is, ↓ in an homomorphism
between 〈CLb, ·〉 and 〈VLb, ·〉.
Theorem 10 (Homomorphism between causal graphs and values)
The mapping ↓: CLb,−→VLb is an injective homomorphism between 〈CLb,+,∗·〉 and 〈VLb,+,∗, ·〉,
Proof . This follows directly from the Theorem 1 and Proposition 15
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Proposition 16
For every causal term t without addition ‘+’ there exists a causal graph G such that t = ↓G.
Proof . In case that t is a label, by definition is the principal ideal ↓ t. We proceed by structural
induction. In case that t = ∏S, by induction hypothesis, for every ti ∈ S there is some causal
graph Gi such that ti = ↓Gi and from Theorem 1 it follows that
t =∏S =∏{ ↓Gi
∣∣ ti ∈ S }= ↓{ Gi ∣∣ ti ∈ S }
which is a principal ideal. In case that t = t1 · t2, by induction hypothesis, t1 = ↓G1 and t2 = ↓G2
and from Proposition 15, it follows that
t = t1 · t2 = ↓G1 · ↓G2 = ↓(G1 ·G2)
which is a principal idea.
Lemma 8.1
Let Gu and Gv be two causal graphs. If Gu ⊇ Gv, then term(Gu)≤ term(Gv) follows from the
equivalence laws reflected in Figures 12 and 13.
Proof . By definition term(Gu)∗ term(Gv) is equal to
∏
{
u1·u2
∣∣ (u1,u2) ∈ Gu }∗∏{ v1·v2 ∣∣ (v1,v2) ∈ Gv } (11)
and since, Gu ⊇ Gv, it follows that every edge (v1,v2) ∈ Gv also belong to Gu. Thus applying
associative and conmutative laws we can rewrite (11) as
∏
{
u1·u2
∣∣ (u1,u2) ∈ Gu\Gv }∗∏{ (v1·v2)∗ (v1·v2) ∣∣ (v1,v2) ∈ Gv }
that, by product idempotence, is clearly equivalent to
∏
{
u1·u2
∣∣ (u1,u2) ∈ Gu\Gv }∗∏{ (v1·v2) ∣∣ (v1,v2) ∈ Gv }
That is, term(Gu)∗ term(Gv) = term(Gu) which implies term(Gu)≤ term(Gv).
Lemma 8.2
Let U and V be two causal values. If U ⊆V , then term(U)≤ term(V ) follows from the equiva-
lence laws reflected in Figures 12 and 13.
Proof . By definition term(U)+ term(V ) is equal to
∑{ term(Gu)
∣∣ Gu ∈U }+∑{ term(Gv) ∣∣ Gv ∈V } (12)
and since, U ⊆V , it follows that every c-graph Gu ∈U also belong to V . Thus applying associa-
tive and conmutative laws we can rewrite (12) as
∑
{
Gu
∣∣ (u1,u2) ∈U }+∑{ Gv+Gv ∣∣ Gv ∈V\U }
that, by summ idempotence, is clearly equivalent to
∑
{
Gu
∣∣ (u1,u2) ∈U }+∑{ Gv ∣∣ Gv ∈V\U }
That is, term(U)+ term(V ) = term(V ) which implies term(U)≤ term(V ).
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Proposition 17 (Application associativity)
Let T , U and W be three causal values. Then, it holds that U · (T ·W ) = (U ·T ) ·W and further
U ·T ·W = ↓{ GU ·GT ·GW ∣∣ GU ∈U, GT ∈ T and GW ∈W }.
Proof . By definition it follows that
(U ·T ) ·W = ↓{ GU ·GT
∣∣ GU ∈U and GT ∈ T } ·W
= ↓{ G′ ·GW
∣∣ GU ∈U, GT ∈ T, G′ ≤ GU ·GT and GW ∈W }
= ↓{ (GU ·GT ) ·GW
∣∣ GU ∈U, GT ∈ T and GW ∈W }
In the same way, it also follows that
U · (T ·W ) = ↓{ GU · (GT ·GW )
∣∣ GU ∈U, GT ∈ T and GW ∈W }
Then it is enough to show that (GU ·GT ) ·GW = GU · (GT ·Gw) =GU ·GT ·GW which holds due
to Proposition 2.
Proposition 18 (Application absorption)
Let T , U and W be three causal values. Then T = T + U ·T ·W and U ·T ·W = T ∗U ·T ·W
Proof . From Proposition 17 it follows that
U ·T ·W = ↓{ GU ·GT ·GW ∣∣ GU ∈U, GT ∈ T and GW ∈W }
Furthermore, for every c-graph GT ∈ T , it holds that GU ·GT · TW ≤ GT . Then, since T is an
ideal, it follows that GU ·GT ·TW ∈ T and consequently U ·T ·W ⊆ T . Thus U ·T ·W ∪T = T and
U ·T ·W ∩T =U ·T ·W and, by definition, these equalities can be rewritten as U ·T ·W +T = T
and U ·T ·W ∗T =U ·T ·W .
Proposition 19 (Application distributivity w.r.t. additions)
Let T , U and W be three causal values. Then, it holds that U · (T +W ) = (U ·T )+ (U ·W and
(U +T ) ·W = (U ·W )+(T ·W ).
Proof . By definition, it follows that
(U ·T )+(U ·W ) = (U ·T )∪ (U ·W )
= ↓{ GU ·GT ∣∣ GU ∈U and GT ∈ T } ∪ ↓{ GU ·GT ∣∣ GU ∈U and GW ∈W }
= ↓{ GU ·G′ ∣∣ GU ∈U and G′ ∈ T ∪W }=U · (T ∪W ) =U · (T +W )
Furthermore (U +T ) ·W = (U ·W )+(T ·W ) holds symmetrically.
Product distributivity laws follows from Propositions 5 and 6.
Corollary 5
The applications distributivity properties reflected in Figure 13 hold.
Proof . From proposition 16, it follows that c, d and e are the principal ideals ↓Gc, ↓Gd and
↓Ge for some c-graphs Gc, Gd and Ge. Furthermore, from Proposition 5 distributivity holds for
causal graphs, i.e. Gc · (Gd ∗Ge) = (Gc ·Gd)∗ (Gc ·Ge) and (Gc ∗Gd) ·Ge = (Gc ·Ge)∗ (Gd ·Ge)
and from Theorem 10 it follows that this also holds for they principal ideals ↓Gc, ↓Gd and ↓Ge.
In the same way, from Proposition 6, it follows c ·d · e = (c ·d)∗ (d · e).
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Proposition 20 (Application identity and annihilator)
Given a causal value T , it holds that T = 1 ·T , T = T ·1, 0 = T ·0 and 0 = 0 ·T .
Proof . Note that 1 and 0 respectively correspond to CLb and /0 and by definition it follows that
1 ·T = ↓{ G ·GT ∣∣ G ∈ CLb and GT ∈ T }= T
0 ·T = ↓{ G ·GT ∣∣ G ∈ /0 and GT ∈ T }= /0 = 0
The other cases are symmetric.
Proposition 21 (Application idempotentce)
Given a label l, it holds that l · l = l
Proof . By definition l corresponds to the causal value ↓Gl where Gl is the causal graphs which
contains the only edge (l, l). Furthermore Gl ·Gl = Gl and from Theorem 10 it follows that
↓Gl = ↓Gl · ↓Gl and consequently l = l · l.
Proposition 22 (Causal term representation)
For every causal value T is equal to ∑
{
term(G)
∣∣ G ∈ T }.
Proof . For every causal term T , it holds that T = ∑{ ↓G
∣∣ G ∈ T }. Furthermore, from Propo-
sition 3, it follows that every causal graph G is equal to ∏{ l1 · l2
∣∣ (l1, l2) is an edge of G } and
then, from Theorem 10, it holds that ↓G = ∏{ l1 · l2
∣∣ (l1, l2) is an edge of G }. Consequently
T = ∑{ term(G)
∣∣ G ∈ T }.
Proposition 23
Every causal term without sums c can be rewritten as normal(c) def=∏{ l1 ·l2)
∣∣ (l1, l2) is an edge of G }
for some casual graph G using the algebraic equivalences in Figures 12 and 13.
Proof . We start rewritten c as ∏C where every causal term x ∈C is in the form of l1 · . . . · ln by
by applying the distributive law until no product is in the scope of “·”. Then we remove each
occurrence of 1 applying the identity law and we replace term x by x ·x when x is a label. That is,
we have C′ s.t. every x′ ∈C is equal to x′ = l1 · . . . · ln with n > 1 and li 6= 1. Then we rewrite each
x′ ∈C′ as l1 · l2 ∗ l2 · l3 ∗ . . .∗ ln−1 · ln by successively application of the equivalence c ·d ·e= c ·d ∗
d · e. Finally we add every transitive edge applying the equivalence c ·d ∗d · e = c ·d ∗d · e∗ c · e
(Proposition 10).
Proposition 24
Every causal term t can be rewritten as normal(t) def= { normal(c) ∣∣ c ∈ S } for some set of terms
without sums S using the algebraic equivalences in Figures 12 and 13.
Proof . We only have to rewrite t as a causal term where sums are not in the scope of “∗” and “·”
by successively application of distributivity over sums. Then the statement holds from Proposi-
tion 23
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Proposition 25
Let c and d be causal terms without “+”. Then c ≤ d iff c = c ∗ d follows from the algebraic
equivalences in Figures 12 and 13.
Proof . From Proposition 23, c and d can be rewrite as c′ =∏{ l1 · l2)
∣∣ (l1, l2) is an edge of Gc }
and d′ =∏{ l1 · l2)
∣∣ (l1, l2) is an edge of Gd } for some causal graphs Gc and Gd . Furthermore,
from Proposition 3 and Theorem 10, it holds that ↓Gc = c′ and ↓Gd = d′. Thus, by definition
c≤ d iff ↓Gc ≤ ↓Gd iff ↓Gc =↓Gc ∩ ↓Gd iff ↓Gc = ↓Gc ∗ ↓Gd iff c′ = c′ ∗d′. Let us see that
c′ = c′ ∗d′ can be follows from the algebraic equivalences.
